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Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance:
Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes
of Identity Politics
William N. Eskridge, Jr.t
A Houston neighbor of John Geddes Lawrence complained
to the Harris County sheriff's office that a suspicious black man
had entered Lawrence's apartment.! Jumping to the conclusion
that the man was a burglar, the sheriffs office swiftly dispatched a team of police to Lawrence's apartment. The officers
entered the apartment, where they found Lawrence and Tyron
Garner, the alleged "burglar," engaged in consensual anal sex.
The shocked officers arrested the couple, humiliated them, and
jailed them for twenty-four hours. By these petty actions, Harris County handed Lambda Legal Education and Defense Fund
the case everyone supporting gay rights had been waiting forthe application of a state sodomy law to intercourse by consenting adults within the home.
The precise result of these police shenanigans was litigation challenging the constitutionality of the Texas Homosexual
Conduct Law, which makes it a misdemeanor for two consenting adults to commit "deviate sexual intercourse," but only if
the two adults are of the same sex.2 The Texas courts denied
t John A. Garver Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Author of Brief of
the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102). I greatly profited from presenting
earlier drafts of this Article at the University of Minnesota and N.Y.U. Law
Schools. Particularly useful were written comments from, and extended conversations with, Amy Adler, Barry Adler, Suzanne Bryant, Dan Farber, Eleanor Fox, Barry Friedman, Larry Kramer, Sylvia Law, Miranda Oshige
McGowan, David McGowan, Bill Nelson, and Mark Tushnet.
1. The statement of facts is taken from the Respondent's Brief, Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102). See also Lawrence v. State, 41
S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. App. 2001), reu'd sub nom. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.
Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) (declared unconstitutional
by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472). Deviate sexual intercourse is defined to include
both oral and anal sex. Id. § 21.01(1). Deviate sexual intercourse between two
people of different sexes was completely legal in Texas so long as they were
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Lawrence and Garner's constitutional challenge, and the U.S.
Supreme Court took review in Lawrence v. Texas.3
As had been widely expected among legal experts, the
Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,4 a 1986 decision which
had rejected right to privacy challenges to Georgia's consensual
sodomy law.5 No one, however, anticipated the breadth of the
Court's opinion. Scholars had exposed historical as well as logical problems with Justice Byron White's surly opinion in
Hardwick. Writing for five Justices in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy explored those flaws and duly noted that American courts,
as well as commentators from a variety of perspectives, had
overwhelmingly disapproved of Hardwick (almost unheard-of in
our system). 6 Courts in Europe had also rejected Hardwick's
understanding of personal privacy.7 More surprisingly, however, Justice Kennedy announced that the disrespect shown to
the lives and liberties of gay people was the greatest flaw of
Hardwick. By treating gay people as presumptive outlaws
rather than as citizens, Hardwick was wrong the day it was decided.' The Supreme Court almost never says that. Most surprisingly, Kennedy's opinion emphasized the ways in which
Hardwick had been deployed to deprive gay people of an array
of rights and freedoms. 9 His assumption was that gay people
presumptively deserve to be treated as equal citizens and not
as outlaws.
Concurring in the Court's judgment, but not in overruling
Hardwick, Justice O'Connor relied on the Equal Protection
Clause as her basis for invalidating the Texas Homosexual
Conduct Law."° Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia vigorously dissented." These concurring
and dissenting opinions raise a number of serious questions
about the Court's holding and its reasoning.
History. The Due Process Clause gives special protection to

both adults, both consented, and it occurred within the home or another private place.
3. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (2003).
5. Id. at 196.
6. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480-83.
7. Id. at 2483.
8. Id. at 2478, 2484-86.
9. Id. at 2482.
10. Id. at 2484-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
11. Id. at 2488-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

20041

JURISPRUDENCEOF TOLERANCE

1023

liberties traditionally recognized as beyond the state's regulation. The Court in Lawrence protected a liberty interest that
Hardwick had found "facetious" in light of historic AngloAmerican criminalization of sodomy. Can Lawrence's liberty interest be squared with the history of state sodomy regulation?
With the original intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Does Lawrence reflect
a new approach to sub12
stantive due process protection?
Stare Decisis. Justice Scalia's dissent accused the Court of
playing fast and loose with stare decisis, the presumptive respect that the Court's precedents are supposed to enjoy. Can
Lawrence be squared with principles of stare decisis? Relevant
to that inquiry is the fact that the Court could have struck
down the Texas sodomy law on the ground that it violated the
equal protection of "homosexuals," as Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion urged. Instead, the Court took the broader
path, overruling Hardwick. Why did the Court go out of its way
to overrule a leading constitutional precedent, when an excellent but narrower ground presented itself? 3
Countermajoritarian Judicial Activism. The dissenters
suggested that the Court's decision was contrary to both history
and precedent-making the decision lawless. They also suggested that it was undemocratic. The Court not only nullified
the Texas statute, but also nullified consensual sodomy laws in
thirteen other states: Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia." If, as the Court
seemed to think, such laws are outdated legal relics, should the
Court not have left them to state legislative processes to repeal? Such a broad, and arguably unnecessary, ruling exposes
the countermajoritarian nature of the Court's exercise of power.

12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West
1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505
(1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.158 (West 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (2000); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 566.090 (West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 886 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (West 2003); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-403 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1996); see also
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE

CLOSET app. at 362-71 (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW] (outlining
state and federal statutes discriminating on the basis of sexual or gender
variation).
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Can this be defended under democratic premises?1 5
The End of Morals Legislation? Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion sounded an alarm that Lawrence means the end of
state morals legislation-including laws criminalizing incest,
fornication, bestiality, adultery, etc. Thus, the assertedly lawless and undemocratic nature of the Court's decision is not limited just to sodomy laws; all morals laws are now in play, the
dissenters maintained. To sweep them away in their entirety
would be a dramatically undemocratic display of judicial activism. To leave some in place (ultimately) would involve linedrawing best left to the democratic process. 16
Complete Homo Equality? The dissent went much further
in its accusations. Justice Scalia also claimed that the majority
was, in essence, adopting the entire "homosexual agenda."
Hence, Lawrence spells finis for the armed forces' exclusion of
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals and requires states to recognize same-sex marriages. Many gay people agree with the dissent-the Constitution does require states to recognize samesex unions and does require the federal government to allow
openly gay people to serve in the armed forces. Most Americans
still do not support full homo equality, however. For some, full
equality for gays would be identity shattering. Can the judiciary 1foist
the entire gay rights program on an unwilling Amer7
ica?
What Is Motivating the Justices? Perhaps the biggest mystery of all is the only one the dissenters failed to mention: What
is motivating the majority Justices? At the very least, there
was much play in the history and the precedents, but the fact
remains that a majority of the Justices serving on the very conservative Rehnquist Court rejected the main legal authority on
point (Hardwick) when it ruled that states cannot criminalize
private consensual sodomy. Why would these jurists go out of
their way to discover constitutional rights for gay people, and
with soaring rhetoric found only in a handful of Supreme Court
decisions? It is implausible to think, as Justice Scalia suggests,
that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are moles for homo equality. But then what explains their boldness?'
This Article shall answer these questions, starting with the

15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. See discussion infra Part V.
17. See discussion infra Part VI.
18. See discussion infra Parts I & IV.
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last one and then considering each of the foregoing questions
from the beginning. The key to understanding Lawrence-and
all its doctrinal complexities-is the Supreme Court's recognition that American democratic pluralism must meet the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) rights movement at least halfway. After a century of discrimination and
persecution, lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals have demonstrated through their lives that traditional state antigay discrimination and persecution were unjust. Through their political activism, these Americans have claimed the right to be
considered equal citizens and not presumptive outlaws. They
have asserted that they can no longer be denigrated in public
discourse-and that a Supreme Court that denigrates them is a
Court wounding itself as well as America. But contrary to the
dissenters, Lawrence only sets a new floor for gay people, and
not the same floor that straight Americans can take for
granted. Lawrence gives us nothing less than, but also nothing
more than, a jurisprudence of tolerance. This means that traditionalists can no longer deploy the state to hurt gay people or
render them presumptive criminals, but room remains for the
state to signal the majority's preference for heterosexuality,
marriage, and traditional family values.
The jurisprudence of tolerance is a conservative theory of
judicial review, and it is the theory that best justifies, and perhaps inspires, the positions taken by the Court in Lawrence
and other recent gay rights cases. Ironically, it is a theory that
justifies a fair amount of activist judicial review-not just the
invalidation of consensual sodomy laws in Lawrence, but also
the Court's ruling that a sexual orientation antidiscrimination
law could not constitutionally be applied to require the Boy
Scouts to retain an openly gay scoutmaster. 9 What the cases
share is the Court's commitment to lowering the stakes of identity politics. The LGBT social movement wants to persuade
America that gay is good, while the traditional family values
(TFV) countermovement wants to persuade America that many
gay rights would undermine the family, marriage, and other
cherished institutions. This is a fine debate for America to
have. The Court is simply insisting that the players not hit below the belt and turn a fair fight into a brawl.
The flip side of the jurisprudence of tolerance is that there
are limits to the Court's activism. Even progay Justices realize
19. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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that a Court that can insist on tolerance cannot insist on acceptance if the country is not willing to go along. Contrary to the
Lawrence dissent, the Rehnquist Court will not, anytime soon,
impose same-sex marriage on unwilling states, at least in part
because such a ruling would raise the stakes of politics in this
culture clash. Instead, the Court's strategy is to defer the most
divisive issues to other parts of our federal system: Individual
states will be left to struggle with the issue of same-sex marriage, and the national legislature and executive will continue
to deliberate the armed forces' exclusion of LGBT people. But
the Court will remain as a productive referee for other fundamental antigay discriminations, including some that remain in
state criminal, family, and employment law.
I. LAWRENCE, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
AND REGIME SHIFTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Supreme Court is responsive to the constitutional politics of social movements. In earlier work, I have identified the
way the process of mutual influence developed between the
Court and the great identity-based social movements of the
twentieth century. 20 The civil rights movement is the exemplar.
American law systematically disadvantaged citizens based
upon their race and ethnicity. The various forms of legal discrimination, and the violence associated with them, ensured
that people of color would be second-class citizens. During the
twentieth century, a steadily increasing number of such people
objected to this discrimination and cooperated in a mass social
movement for their civil rights.2
At first, normative civil-rights politics focused on the most
immediate physical aggressions of the state against AfricanAmericans. Thus, the NAACP's politics of protection main20. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); William N.

Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Twentieth Century].
21.

Classic accounts include DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS:

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE (1986); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1976); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984). For a

shorter and more popular account, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY
COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY 1890-2000 (2001).
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tained that racial variation did not justify state brutalization of
people of color through the criminal process and police misconduct. This politics found expression in the protections of the
Due Process Clause, which the NAACP persuaded even conservative Justices to construe to provide a national code of criminal procedure to protect citizens from police brutality and abusive arrest and prosecution. Once black people made some
progress on the protection front, and energized more people of
all colors to support equal rights, the movement's politics expanded. The NAACP's politics of recognition came front and
center in the 1940s, when its litigating arm, the Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc. (Inc. Fund), took aim at apartheid,
the system of interlocking discriminations and exclusions that
defined people of color as second-class citizens.22 This politics
found expression in the Equal Protection Clause. Brown v.
Board of Education24 and subsequent cases illustrate the Supreme Court's acceptance of the NAACP's recognition politics.
Once the main de jure exclusions had been swept away, the
civil rights movement shifted toward a serious politics of remediation, focused mostly in the political process.
Why did the Supreme Court substantially accept the constitutional politics of the civil rights movement in the twentieth
century? One way of thinking about this question is to consider
the strategies that social movement deployed to motivate
judges to decide cases in their favor. Naive strategies assumed
that judges would (more or less) neutrally apply the law and
sought to present an expanded factual and normative context
within which even a skeptical but open-minded judge would
feel logically compelled to recognize the rights of a minority
within the governing legal or constitutional framework. Thus,
in dozens of criminal procedure cases, from the 1920s through
the 1960s, lawyers for black defendants presented the Court

22. See 1 CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (1967)
(discussing early NAACP protective litigation).
23. Nancy Fraser inspires the term "politics of recognition," even though
she uses it somewhat differently from the way I do. On the politics of recognition for the civil rights movement, see KLUGER, supra note 21 (providing a detailed examination of the NAACP's antiapartheid litigation campaign); MARK
V.

TUSHNET,

THE

NAACP'S

LEGAL

STRATEGY

AGAINST

SEGREGATED

EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (similar); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity
and Desegregation:Decisionmakingin the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1979).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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with factually frightening scenarios where the Justices did not
see their choice as being doctrinal innovation versus stare decisis; instead, they saw their choice as applying the Constitution to serve its underlying rule of law purposes versus tolerating a state of nature in the South.25 Once the Justices had
decided these cases, the NAACP could cite them as precedent
for regulating less-frightening scenarios and for framing
broader constitutional rules. The Inc. Fund's famous decadeslong litigation campaign to end apartheid was the apotheosis of
the case-by-case approach taken by the same lawyers in the
criminal procedure cases.26 Viewing the evolution of doctrine
from case to case provides many examples of how judges from a
range of perspectives could agree with minority claims when
presented in the context of outrageous facts or new developments in formal law.
A limitation of naive strategies was that the new fact
situations and novel angles on old issues allowed judges to create favorable doctrine but did not compel them to do so. Accordingly, the Inc. Fund and allied attorneys also followed sophisticated strategies, which assumed that judges' decisions were
influenced by their own political preferences, and sought to
mold or appeal to those preferences. The Justices appointed by
Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower were committed to a democratic pluralism, whereby all groups would, at
least as a formal matter, have a fair chance to sway public
opinion and participate in government.27 Civil rights lawyers
could argue that deprivation of political and civil rights (voting
and jury exclusions, segregation) to minorities was inconsistent
with the open and pluralistic features of American democracy
that set it apart from Nazi and Communist totalitarianism.
The uncomfortable echoes of Nazi racism or Communist totalitarianism in the race cases outraged some of the Justices and
made even the least sympathetic Justices reluctant to oppose
25. See Eskridge, Twentieth Century, supra note 20, at 2073-82, 2202-35
(providing detailed analysis of the NAACP's criminal procedure and habeas
corpus cases); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 48 (2000) (giving a close examination of the earliest NAACP criminal procedure cases).
26. See supra note 21 (listing the classic and popular accounts of the litigation campaign).
27. See RICHARD PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 177-233
(1999); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 197-217, 235-66
(1973).
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any relief whatsoever.
It is important to understand that the civil rights movement was far more than strategic-it was overwhelmingly
normative from the beginning. Its foundational politics was to
change public norms away from understanding racial variation
(nonwhite) as malignant, toward understanding racial variation as completely benign.2 9 To the extent that the movement
was successful in moving public opinion and political discourse
in the benign variation direction, that success had payoffs in
constitutional litigation as well. Once Justices realized that the
audience for their opinions included many critics who viewed
people of color as just as important to the body politic as white
people, the Justices changed the tone of their writing and made
an effort to understand and appear responsive to minority
claims. Thus, even the conservative Eisenhower appointees
(like Harlan and Stewart) were willing to join more liberal Justices (like Douglas and Warren) in aggressively interpreting the
Constitution to protect people of color against hostile or discriminatory state action.
Cynical strategies assume that Justices are partisan and
essentially just part of the political process. The most obvious
punch line for this strategy is to fight for your allies to be appointed to the Court and to oppose appointment of known enemies. It was very important for the civil rights movement when
Thurgood Marshall was appointed to the Court, not just because he could be expected to vote for their interests and articulate their politics of recognition, but also because his mere
presence in conference discredited extremist arguments and
undermined some moderate arguments deployed by the politics
of preservation. Conversely, all four twentieth-century judges
nominated for the Court but defeated by a Senate vote were
opposed mainly by the NAACP and their allies, who viewed the
nominees as prejudiced against minorities.3 0 Even the most
28. See David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and
Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741,
761-79 (1981).

29. See Appendix to Appellants' Briefs, "The Effects of Segregation and
the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement," Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Oct. Term, 1952, No. 8).
30.

See

ETHAN BRONNER,

BATTLE

FOR

JUSTICE:

HOW

THE

BORK

NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989) (discussing the defeat of Reagan's nominee Judge Bork); JOHN P. FRANK, CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, AND
THE SUPREME COURT 57-61, 92-95 (1991) (discussing the defeat of Nixon's
nominee Judge Haynsworth); id. at 100-17 (discussing the defeat of Nixon's
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conservative Presidents have been forced to take account of the
civil rights movement in their efforts to reshape the Court."
A very similar phenomenon can be observed in the Supreme Court's response to women's rights movements. The
birth control movement, the pro-choice movement, and the
equal rights for women (or ERA) movement followed the same
kind of naive, sophisticated, and cynical strategies followed by
the Inc. Fund and other civil rights litigation groups. Even
many of the players were the same; the ACLU was important
in both civil rights and women's rights constitutional litigation,
for example. And the Court was supremely responsive, although it generally has filtered the demands of social movements through the lens of its own institutional interests and
the ideologies of the Justices. Legal bars to women's reproductive and other freedoms and to their equal opportunities could
not be sustained once women started seriously to assert their
equal citizenship as participants in the national political process.
Ironically, the Burger Court, populated with more conservative, "strict constructionist" Justices than the Warren Court,

nominee Judge Carswell);

KENNETH W. GOINGS, "THE NAACP COMES OF
AGE": THE DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN PARKER (1990) (discussing the defeat of
Hoover's nominee Judge Parker).
31. Accordingly, the dominant strategy for conservative Republican Presidents has been to nominate conservatives who can be said to "represent" traditionally Democratic minority groups with whom Republicans are seeking inroads-women (Justice O'Connor), Catholics (Scalia and Kennedy), people of
color (Thomas), bachelors (Souter), and Latinos (presumably the group from
which the second President Bush would draw for a nomination). This strategy
has yielded a Supreme Court that is both ideologically conservative and demographically diverse. The current Court is a veritable Rainbow Coalition
compared to the U.S. Senate, for example.
32. See generally DAVID J. GARROw, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994). On the birth control
movement, see generally ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET
SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1992); DAVID
KENNEDY, BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA: THE CAREER OF MARGARET SANGER
(1970); JAMES REED, THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN

SOCIETY: FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE (1984). On the pro-choice
movement, see generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF
MOTHERHOOD (1984); ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN
THE STATES (2001); SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT:

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT (1991). On the

women's equal rights movement, see generally CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON
ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S ISSUES, 1945-1968 (1988); RUTH
ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
CHANGED AMERICA (2000).
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handed down most of the constitutional precedents that
women's rights groups had. been seeking. In doing so, they expanded constitutional text, ignored precedent, and danced
around original intent as they announced one pathbreaking decision after another. Even conservatives in the new generation
of lawyers understood, from their own experiences or the experiences of women close to them, that modern women were no
longer willing to live within baselines that had been set by
men. They were sexually active and demanded control over the
possibility of pregnancy and childbirth; they were educated and
demanded integration of public colleges and universities; they
were working outside the home and insisted that their workplaces not be hostile or discriminatory.
The landmark constitutional victories for women's rightsRoe v. Wade33 and Craig v. Boren 34-- came much more quickly
than the analogous victories for the civil rights movementBrown and the criminal procedure revolution associated with
Miranda v. Arizona35 and other precedents. One reason that
women won quicker courtroom victories was their potentially
enormous political clout, but also important was the timing: the
women's rights movement followed the civil rights one. The example of African-Americans inspired women of all stations and
colors to imagine that they could be equal citizens with control
over their bodies. Because people of color had been able to
achieve much of their politics of protection and recognition
through assertion of constitutional due process and equal protection rights, women closely followed the Inc. Fund's model.36
Not least important, the success of the civil rights movement provided even conservative Justices with reasons to accept women's constitutional claims (or at least meet them halfway). The Justices were understandably proud of what they
had done in Brown and Loving v. Virginia,3 7 decisions universally acclaimed by law professors and soon accepted as axio33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (announcing an intermediate level of scrutiny for
sex-based classifications).
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Jerold Israel, Selective IncorporationRevisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982) (providing an excellent survey of the criminal
procedure decisions of the 1960s).
36. See Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate of Discrimination":RaceGender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045

(2001) (comparing the historical contexts of the civil rights and feminist
movements).
37. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding miscegenation laws unconstitutional).
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matic among Americans of all political preferences. Reasoning
by analogy from the civil rights precedents, women's rights
counsel were asking the Court to add to its acclaim and were
implicitly suggesting that the Court would be subject to criticism if it did not extend the reasoning of civil rights precedents
to women's claims.3 8 The question of women's rights could no
longer be avoided on the ground that the Court did not enforce
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses aggressivelythe Court had done precisely that in Brown and Loving, decisions women were asking the Court to extend to their claims.
The Burger Court complied.
Inspired by the foregoing precedents, gay people in the
1960s and 1970s asserted both equality claims and privacy
claims. In contrast to the politics of the earlier social movements, the central aim of gay people's politics of both protection
and recognition was the same legal reform-nullification of
sodomy laws." Such laws were a situs for state violence against
gay and bisexual men, many of whom went to prison for consensual activities and many more of whom were subjected to
police and private harassment because of their presumptive
outlaw status. Hence, gay people's politics of protection required sodomy reform. Their outlaw status as presumptive
sodomites also undergirded many state discriminations, hence
gay people's politics of recognition asserted that they could not
be genuinely equal citizens unless their characteristic sexual
activities were decriminalized. Indeed, many state antigay presumptions and discriminations were expressly grounded upon
38. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause requires the state to justify denying a benefit to person A that it gives to person B. The Court's willingness to
help people of color (group B) by sweeping away race-based discriminations
created expectations on the part of women (group A) that sex-based discriminations against them would be similarly swept away. One can imagine several
justifications the Court could have used to treat groups B and A differentlybut the point is that the Justices would have felt pressure to treat them the
same and would have had to produce exceedingly persuasive reasons not to do
so. Realizing that the relevant audience for constitutional decisions regarding
citizenship and equality was increasingly women as well as men, few Justices
would have been willing to make the effort.
39. See Eskridge, Twentieth Century, supra note 20, at 2159-79 (describing the evolution of gay rights politics). The civil rights movement's politics of
protection focused on criminal procedure and the racist operation of the death
penalty, while its politics of recognition challenged rules of race-based segregation. See id. at 2072-96. Women's politics of protection focused on rape reform, the availability of birth control materials and devices, and abortion;
their politics of recognition challenged sex classifications resting upon archaic
stereotypes. See id. at 2113-38.
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the illegal conduct that defined the class.
Before 1986, the Supreme Court was completely unreceptive to these arguments. Most of the Justices operated under
the widely accepted social norm that homosexuality is a malignant sexual variation.40 Based upon this assumption, the Justices ruled (or left in place rulings) that Congress can bar gay
immigrants from entering the country,41 states can send gay
men to jail for long periods of time for engaging in consensual
oral sex in private places,42 states can deny marriage licenses to
same-sex couples,43 local school boards can fire teachers or
counselors if they are "outed" as lesbigay,44 and municipalities
can arrest men and women for dressing in the attire of the
other sex.45
While the Court was tolerating each and every antigay ruling that came before it, gay people were engaged in a politics of
40. The Justices did not have to explain how homosexuality might be malignant, for that was widely accepted as a social fact. Several explanations
showed up in Supreme Court opinions. (1) Homosexuality entails conduct that
was an "abomination" to religious Americans, Leviticus 13:20, and disgusting
to an even wider range. See Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 526 (1962)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (expressing disgust that the Court would allow the mailing of male physique magazines that homosexuals could use as "sex stimulants"). (2) Homosexuality is a mental illness. For many doctors as well as
lawyers, homosexuality was one example of "sexual psychopathy." See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 124 (1967) (interpreting an immigration exclusion for
people "afflicted with psychopathic personality" to include "those having homosexual and perverted characteristics"). (3) Homosexuality is predatory or
contagious. If exposed to homosexuality, youth might become infected. See
Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (comparing
homosexuality to contagious measles and arguing that the state ought to be
able to "quarantine" homosexuals in its colleges and universities, lest young
people be exposed to it). For anecdotal evidence that individual Justices
operated under these norms, see JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING
JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT (2001).

41. Boutilier, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
42. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg mem. 403
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975); Enslin v. State, 425 U.S. 903 (1976), denying
cert. to 214 S.E.2d 318 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding state felony conviction
and one-year prison sentence for consensual oral sex).
43. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissing appeal from 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
44. Rowland v. Mad River Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985), denying cert.
to 703 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
45. Mayes v. Texas, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (denying certiorari to Harris
County Criminal Court at Law No. 4 decision); see Unheard, "No-Merit"Ruling: Supreme Court Upholds Drag Ban, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 24, 1974, at 10
(noting that Texas defended the cross-dressing law as protecting the survival
of the human race by banning "homosexual disguises").
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recognition at the state level. Americans in the Northeast,
Great Lakes region, and West Coast by and large accepted
LGBT people's claims that they and their private conduct did
not pose threats to the community. States in those regions not
only repealed their consensual sodomy laws, but in some cases
adopted laws making it illegal for employers, schools, or public
accommodations to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. This was a signal that social norms were changing: Once
universally accepted as malignant, homosexuality was now understood as a tolerable variation from the norm (still heterosexuality).
When the Supreme Court took review in Hardwick, there
was hope that the Court would sweep away the remaining sodomy laws. Several amicus briefs argued that homosexuality is
in no way pathological and that consensual sodomy is important to the psychological health of individuals and to their intimate relationships, whether homosexual or heterosexual.4 6
The state responded that the statute reflected the moral judgments of the people of Georgia, and the Court could not legitimately interfere with those judgments unless required by constitutional text or well-established precedent. Justice White's
perfunctory opinion for the Court agreed with the state, concluding that it was illegitimate for the unelected Justices to
overturn the state legislature's moral judgment that sodomy is
wrong, without a firmer basis in constitutional text or tradition.47 Even within that framework, however, White's obsessive
focus on "homosexual sodomy," notwithstanding the statute's
inclusion of sodomy of all kinds, exposed the Court to criticism
that it was not treating gay people impartially.48

46. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association and
American Public Health Association in Support of Respondents passim, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140); see also BriefAmicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project et al. passim, Hardwick (No. 85-140) (making a
similar argument, plus noting that sodomy laws contribute to rampant discrimination against gay people in particular).
47. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194-95; see also id. at 191-94 (stating that the
argument that "homosexual sodomy" is protected by the nation's libertarian
tradition is, "at best, facetious").
48. Compare id. at 190, 191, 192, 196 (limiting the decision to "homosexual sodomy"), and id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (similar), with id. at
200-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is morally arbitrary for
the Court to insist that only "homosexual sodomy" is at stake when the challenged statute covers all kinds of sodomy), and id. at 215-16 & 215 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Georgia legislature deliberately expanded
its sodomy law to include all different-sex sodomy).
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Four dissenting Justices not only questioned the Court's
analysis, but recognized the link among LGBT people's equal
citizenship and a constitutional insistence on a more tolerant
approach to benign sexual variation:
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual
intimacy is "a sensitive key relationship of human existence, central
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality." The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant
way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests,
in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways
of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose
the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds."9

The dissenters also contrasted the Court's passivity in Hardwick with its productive activism in Brown, Loving, and Roe,
all of which have been cogently criticized for expanding constitutional freedoms beyond the boundaries suggested by constitutional text and original intent. 50
While Hardwick marked the Supreme Court's rejection of
gay people's constitutional politics, it came just as gay people's
normative politics was starting to show some successpersuading many Americans that homosexuality was at least a
tolerable variationfrom the norm, one that ought not be the basis for criminalization.5' Gay people's politics also persuaded
49. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)) (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 210-11 & 210 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, associated with the
University of Connecticut, found in September 1985 that 31% of a national
sample agreed that "homosexuality should be considered an acceptable lifestyle," with 62% saying it is "basically wrong." Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Univ. of Ct., The Roper Report (Sept. 1985) (on file with author).
This suggests a minority accepting homosexuality as a benign variation, and a
large majority seeing it as something less than benign. A more nuanced poll
conducted by Mark Clement Research for Glamour in the summer of 1986 reported that 800 women responded to the statement, "Homosexuality should be
an accepted alternative lifestyle," in this way:
18% Strongly Agree
28% Slightly Agree
13% Slightly Disagree
38% Strongly Disagree
4% No Opinion
This suggests, to me, that a large middle group (41%) found homosexuality a
tolerable variation, with a small minority (18%) accepting the benign variation
view of gay rights supporters and a bigger minority (38%) accepting the malign variation view adopted in Hardwick. Data from the study was published
in Glamour's January 1987 issue. See How Women's Minds Have Changed in
the Last Five Years, 1987 Women's Views Survey, GLAMOUR, Jan. 1987, at 168
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some Americans that homosexuality is a benign variation and
that gay people are normal and good citizens. Most important,
public opinion polls in 1985 suggested that a majority of Americans believed that, in the long term, homosexuality "will be
widely acceptable. "5 2 Thus, the normative underpinnings of the
Supreme Court's decision (that states are free to deem homosexuality a malignant variation) stood in direct tension with
the new equilibrium in public opinion (homosexuality is at least
a tolerable variation).
Under this state of affairs, Hardwick was more disastrous
for the Court than it was for gay people. Justice White's opinion
was subjected to a level of academic, popular, and judicial scrutiny that virtually no Supreme Court opinion could survive.
The opinion carried with it many self-inflicted errors, and news
reports of hysterical lobbying by the Chief Justice and of Justice Powell's homo-ignorant anguishing over his vote deepened
the bad odor of Hardwick.5 4 Many Americans, gay and straight
alike, read the result and rhetoric of Hardwick as suggesting
that the judiciary was not a neutral forum for gay people to
(data set on file with author).
52. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Univ. of Ct., The Roper Report 85-86 (June 1985) (finding that 52% of a national sample of 2000 respondents agreed with the statement in the text; 40% disagreed) (on file with author). According to the Roper Center, a Gallup Poll asking the same question
found 53% agreeing, 34% disagreeing.
53. Hardwick generated more universal negative comment than any other
decision upholding a statute in the Court's history. For a sampling of the intense criticisms, see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION-A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (1991) (poorly reasoned);

RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 341-47 (1992) (factually ignorant); EVE
KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 70-75 (1990) (manipulative); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-21, at 1422

(2d ed. 1988) (inconsistent with precedent); Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1102-03 (1988) (historically inaccurate); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 187, 197-200 (antifeminist); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic,
97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 (1987) (authoritarian); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 747-50 (1989) (authoritarian); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1461 (1992) (violent). See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Prospectsfor a Revival of Conservative
Activism in ConstitutionalJurisprudence,24 GA. L. REV. 629, 645 n.95 (1990)
(citing thirty-three law review articles and comments criticizing Hardwick).
54.

See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 514-30

(1994) (providing a comprehensive account of Justice Powell's vacillation on
the sodomy issue); Al Kamen, Powell Changed Vote in Sodomy Case, WASH.
POST, July 13, 1986, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy
Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3.
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present their constitutional and other claims.
In the abstract, the Court could have lived with the public
criticism of Hardwick if it could have moved on to other issues.
But Hardwick would not go away. Everywhere the Justices
turned, there were openly lesbian and gay attorneys, law professors, citizens-and (gasp!) even law clerks within their own
building. Everywhere the Justices went in the world, people
asked them how they could demonize gay people as they had in
Hardwick. And every year dozens of new antigay discriminations popped up all over the United States-justified by reading
Hardwick to suggest that open homosexuals, presumptive outlaws, were essentially outside the protection of the Constitution. At some point, the Justices were bound to call a halt to
this.
The case that attracted their attention arose in Colorado.
Alarmed by local antidiscrimination laws "promoting" homosexuality, Colorado for Family Values (CFV) proposed to amend
the state constitution in 1992 to preempt any state or municipal law or policy whereby homosexuality could be the basis for
"any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or
claim of discrimination." In its campaign for voter ratification,
CFV argued that overprivileged (high-income) lesbigay people
did not need the "special rights" that cities were giving them
and that special rights for "homosexuals and lesbians" threatened to deprive ordinary citizens of their rights to speak freely,
worship as they choose, associate with whom they choose, and
control the education of their children.55 After the voters
adopted the proposed amendment, gay people challenged it as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Colorado defended the
law as within its rights under the regime of Hardwick. If the
state can make homosexual sodomites common criminals,
which Colorado did not, then surely they could impose some
civil discriminations on them. "Coloradans are largely tolerant
of homosexuality, yet unwilling to support governmental action
55. COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, EQUAL RIGHTS-NoT SPECIAL
RIGHTS! (1992) (the official ballot materials distributed to voters as an explanation of the proposed amendment), reprinted in Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 167, app. A at 191-99 (1997); see STEPHEN
BRANSFORD, GAY POLITICS VS. COLORADO AND AMERICA: THE INSIDE STORY
OF AMENDMENT 2, at 36-40, app. C at 241-44 (1994) (giving an insider's account of the CFV campaign themes); cf.Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "RepublicanGovernment": The CampaignAgainst Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 19-21 (1993) (describing a similar Oregon antigay

initiative).
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which confers benefits on a relatively privileged group at the
expense of the less-privileged."56
In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court ruled that the antigay amendment was invalidY. That amendment's invalidity
owed something to its breadth, for it effectively authorized employers, landlords, and public accommodations to discriminate
against gay people, but left straight people with a remedy if
they were objects of sexual orientation discrimination. The
Court could therefore have issued a very narrow ruling:
Broadly excluding one class of people from the ordinary protections of the rule of law is a core violation of the requirement
that the state afford "the equal protection of the law."58 Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court, however, was unprecedented
in the extent to which it paid tribute to LGBT people's politics
of recognition. The opinion not only referred to the respondents
respectfully as gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals, but articulated the protections served by antidiscrimination laws as
"normal" protections everyone else either takes for granted or
enjoys-and not as the "special rights" claimed by the state and
the dissenting opinion. 59 Justice Kennedy also openly recognized that much of the support of the amendment was inspired
by antigay "animus," again a striking contrast with the dissent's emphasis on Coloradan tolerance. 60
Most strikingly, the six-Justice majority ignored Hardwick,
a silence stressed by Justice Scalia in dissent.61 Romer left
Hardwick in constitutional limbo, but Hardwick in turn cast
some doubt on how broadly the Court was prepared to read
Romer. This left the lower courts to their own devices. Generally speaking, Romer coincided with, and probably contributed
to, a strong progay shift in state court decisions affecting LGBT
56. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 15, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(No. 94-1039). The state reported polling data showing that large majorities of
Coloradans believed that "homosexuals are not really different from anyone
else" and should be allowed to serve in the military and engage in private intimacy with consenting adults. Id. at 15 n.24.
57. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
58. Id.
59. Compare id. at 630-31 (majority opinion), with id. at 638 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). On the deployment of "special rights" rhetoric by anti-civil rights
as well as antigay groups, see Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate
in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 283, 288-91 (1994).
60. Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 634-35 (majority opinion), with id.
at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 640-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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people. After 1996, a number of state courts in the Northeast,
Midwest, and West Coast handed down landmark rulings in favor of same-sex marriage, second-parent adoptions, and equal
employment benefits. 2 Starting from antigay baselines, courts
in the South, Border States, and Rocky Mountain States did
not go that far, but after Romer many of them did retreat from
disrespectful and openly discriminatory treatment of lesbian
and gay parents. More significantly, judges in these states issued a series of decisions invalidating consensual sodomy laws
under their state constitutions-in striking contrast to the Supreme Court's rejection of Hardwick's privacy challenge.63 Only
in Louisiana and Texas did judges refuse invitations to strike
down state sodomy laws after Romer.64 The Texas case, of
course, was the occasion for the Supreme Court to revisit either
Hardwick or Romer.
As it turned out, Lawrence provided the Justices with an
opportunity to revisit both Hardwick and Romer-overruling
the first precedent and reading the second precedent expansively.65 Formally, Lawrence confirmed the view that antigay
sentiment was no more a rational basis under the Due Process
Clause than it had been under the Equal Protection Clause.
The state cannot discriminate against gay people simply because of their sexual orientation; invoking "morality" does not
save such discrimination. Lawrence also nullified consensual
sodomy laws. This holding negated a powerful argument states
had been using to justify antigay presumptions in family law,
state employment, and public education."
62. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 283-97, 1081-82, 1553-63 (2d ed. 2004) (same-sex
marriages); id. at 1199-1224 (parenting and second-parent adoption cases); id.
at 879-84, 1048-62 (employment benefits for domestic partners).
63. The first such decision was before Romer. See Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 500 (Ky. 1992). For decisions striking down consensual sodomy laws under state constitutions after Romer, see Campbell v.
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied, (June
10, 1996), Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112, 127 (Mont. 1997), Powell v.
State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (the Hardwick law), State v. Cogshell, 997
S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), reh'g denied, (Oct. 1, 2002), and Jegley v.
Picado, 80 S.W.2d 332, 353-54 (Ark. 2002).
64. State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501, 512 (La. 2000); Lawrence v. State, 41
S.W.3d 349, 362 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
65. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482-84 (2003).
66. The sodomy argument for antigay discrimination goes something like
this: (1) This lesbian presumptively engages in illegal sodomy. (2) The state
can prefer law-abiding citizens to law-breaking citizens in deciding who gets
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Rhetorically, Lawrence confirmed that Romer was no fluke.
Six Justices were committed to the proposition that lesbian,
gay, and bisexual Americans must be treated with respect by
legislators as well as judges. The respect paid to gay people was
complemented by the disrespect paid to Hardwick. Justice
Kennedy's opinion opened with the statement that the previous
precedent "fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at
stake" and phrased the issue presented in a way "that demean[ed] the claim the individual put forward."67 He then examined the historiographical criticisms of Hardwick and its
universal rejection in national and international public opinion." The Court concluded that "Hardwick was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today."69 Never in its
history has the Supreme Court so pointedly repudiated a
precedent. With this rebuke, an era in constitutional history
ended.
Read together, Romer and Lawrence represent a regime
shift for gay people analogous to the regime shift that Brown
and Loving represented for people of color and that Roe 70 and
Craig7' represented for women. In all three sets of cases, the
Court announced a new constitutional baseline that was substantially closer to the norms espoused by an identity-based social movement, albeit with some interesting differences among
the three pairs of cases. In Brown/Loving, the Court accepted
the norm that racial variation is benign as a matter of fact and
ought to be treated as irrelevant as a matter of law. In
Roe/Craig, the Court accepted the norm that sex variation is
wonderful as a matter of fact and ought to be treated as substantially irrelevant as a matter of law. In Romer/Lawrence,
the Court accepted the norm that sexual variation is tolerable
as a matter of fact and ought to be treated as presumptively irrelevant as a matter of law.
In each of the realigning pairs of precedents, the Court
viewed the long-term action of the law on social minorities at

custody of children after the demise of a marriage, whom the state should hire
as police officers or prosecuting attorneys, or who can be foster or adoptive
parents. (3) Therefore, the state can prefer the law-abiding heterosexual to the

law-breaking lesbian.
67.

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.

68. Id. at 2478-83.
69. Id. at 2484.
70.
71.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
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least partially through the eyes of the minorities and spoke to
them as equal citizens who have to be treated with respect and
dignity-and not as outcasts (people of color) or housekeepers
(women) or outlaws (gay people). In my view, the Court had no
choice but to make these moves if it were to retain the aura of
neutrality that is essential for its legitimacy. But I also believe
that at least some of the Justices were motivated by something
more than institutional self-interest. The time had come, they
understood, for America to move beyond discriminatory rules
that the objects of the discrimination would no longer accept.
This regime shift does not entail radical changes in the law
overnight. To the contrary, each regime shift has come deliberately, even slowly, and certainly incompletely from the social
movement's point of view. The Court declined to order immediate desegregation after Brown I; the "all deliberate speed" formula of Brown If had little bite until the Great Society.72 And it
took the Court thirteen years after Brown to muster the courage to nullify miscegenation laws in Loving. 3 Because resistance was much lower to ending sex discrimination, the Court
moved more swiftly on that front, while at the same time retreating from Roe when it encountered resurgent opposition to
its broad protections for pregnant women.74 Like the Brown
Court, the Romer/Lawrence Court will probably leave it to local state and federal judges to decide which antigay discriminations stand or fall. Like the Casey Court,75 the Court ten or
twenty years hence may retreat from some of the sweeping
rhetoric of Romer/Lawrence. Or, like the VMI Court, it may
give it deeper bite. 6 What is certain is that the Supreme Court
in Romer/Lawrence sees itself as having swept away the prior
constitutional regime of Hardwick and initiated a new constitutional regime where tolerance of LGBT people is a floor below
which state policy cannot fall.
72. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) ("all deliberate
speed" formula); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE
SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979) (nonenforce-

ment of Brown I until 1960s).
73. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
74. See Erin Daly, ReconsideringAbortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the
New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77 (1995);
Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in ConstitutionalJurisprudence,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025 (1994).
75. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
76. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536-37 (1996).

1042

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1021

II. LAWRENCE, ORIGINAL INTENT,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME SHIFTS
The Lawrence dissenters objected that shifting regimes to
require tolerance of a previously despised minority group is a
political judgment that should be left to the legislature. 7 To the
extent it is a constitutional judgment, it is one properly left to
"We the People" acting through an amendment to the Constitution. In short, it is not a legal judgment to be made by the Supreme Court. The Court said nothing in direct response. One
answer to such an objection is that the Supreme Court's individual rights jurisprudence for the twentieth century stands
against it.75 The process for amending the Constitution is moribund. For the Court to abandon almost 100 years of activism,
and to use LGBT people as the victims to accomplish that volteface, would be a daring and surely futile move. 9
Another answer is that regime shifts are not only possible,
but are sometimes required of the Supreme Court as the interpreter of the Fourteenth Amendment. An underlying debate in
Lawrence relates to the methodology by which the Court ought
to be interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments. Although
the dissenting Justices are much more certain that their original meaning approach is the only legitimate one for constitutional interpretation, I believe Lawrence illustrates the desirability of an equally distinguished tradition, rooted in legal
process theory.
A.

HARDWICK AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ORIGINAL MEANING

Justice Scalia's central complaint is that the Lawrence
Court was departing from constitutional text, original meaning,
and precedent when it overruled Hardwick-and that the
Court was doing that for an illegitimate politically correct reason: to impose the "homosexual agenda" supported by intellec-

77. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2497 (2003).
78. This is the argument extensively documented in Eskridge, Twentieth
Century, supra note 20, at 2375-89.
79. The move would be futile because whatever the Court were to do in
gay rights cases, it would still be tempted to engage in the same amendmentdenying activism in other cases, such as affirmative action, redistricting, takings, and federalism cases for die-hard conservatives, and women's rights, racial segregation, death penalty, and abortion cases for moderates. For both
camps, they would include speech and freedom-of-association cases. For an obviously activist Court to deny most minimal rights to gay people-and them
alone-would ultimately destroy that Court's appearance of neutrality.
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tuals and elites on an unwilling populace." There is legal bite
to Scalia's critique. In his understanding, the Constitution is
our social contract, a historically powerful one in which "We the
People" actually participated in ratifying the permanent
framework for governance. Because the legitimacy of the social
contract is democratic and participatory, the contract should be
interpreted and applied by judges according to its original
meaning-the meaning that it would have had for the white
men ratifying the original document or any of its twenty-seven
amendments. Conversely, it is a violation of the social contract
for unelected judges to read their own values into the Constitution, thereby trumping the values woven into the document by
our ancestors, as well as those more recently adopted by our
elected officials.
This classic jurisprudence of original intent is inspired by
many worthy values, including the rule of law, democracy, and
deliberation. If judges follow an objectively determinable original meaning, they are imbuing constitutional law with the rule
of law values of objectivity, transparency, and predictability.
Although such original meaning will sometimes trump the will
of current majorities, it is ultimately consistent with democracy
because it reflects the will of engaged supermajorities. Not
least important, the Constitution of 1787, the Bill of Rights,
and the Reconstruction Amendments were the products of an
active and alert citizenry deliberating in the most intelligent
way about the enduring structure of American governance.
If judges ignore or misapply original constitutional meaning, they are sacrificing the virtues of a rule of law, democracy,
and deliberation. The sacrifice is doubly harmful-and completely indefensible-if judges substitute their own will or preferences for those of the Framers. This was the point Byron
White was trying to make in Hardwick, and a point that would
have been made more effectively without the gratuitously antihomosexual language. There is no right of sexual privacy in the
constitutional text, nor was one ever mentioned in the constitutional deliberations. The Due Process Clause does protect "liberty," but primarily by assuring persons that the state will follow appropriate procedures if it threatens to deprive them of
liberties. A line of precedent also gives a substantive, antiarbitrariness protection to certain kinds of liberties-those that

80. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""' If this test
were nothing more than an abstract exercise, it would amount
to the codification of judicial preferences. To avoid the pall of
judicial legislation, Justice White reasoned, the Court has typically applied the test by an historical inquiry: Has this liberty
been one which has traditionally been considered beyond state
regulation in Anglo-American history?
This line of "substantive due process" cases was the basis
for the Court's decisions assuring women substantial freedom
of choice to use contraceptives and to have abortions.8 2 Intelligent judges and commentators criticized those decisions as inconsistent with the original meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments; which were adopted in a period when the states
were regulating the availability of contraceptives and prohibiting abortions. Without some affirmative basis for believing that
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to protect
people's decisions relating to procreation and childbirth, the interpreter should assume that the Framers did not mean to displace existing regulations of such activities. Such should have
been the assumption in Eisenstadt and Roe, which were, by
Justice White's standards, wrongly decided.83 They were illegitimate judicial legislation, because they represented the Justices' personal views that contraception and abortion were fundamental to women's lives. The Court had substituted its own
value system for those of both the historical Framers and current legislators, and that kind of judicial arrogance was the
height of illegitimacy.
For Justice White then, Hardwick presented the Court
with a choice of either expanding the illegitimate reasoning of
Eisenstadt and Roe, or limiting the damage those precedents
had on judicial legitimacy by narrowing their holdings to their
particular factual settings (decisions not to have children). Jus-

81. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 544-49 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As Justice Cardozo said in
Palko, the Due Process Clause protects freedom of thought and speech against
state regulation because they constitute a "matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 302 U.S. at 327.
82. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 454 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
83. Justice White concurred in the Griswold judgment on narrow grounds
and did not reach the general right to privacy discussion entailed in the opin-

ions of Justices Douglas (for the Court), Goldberg, and Harlan. Griswold, 381
U.S. at 502-05. White concurred in the result in Eisenstadt and dissented in
Roe. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 460; Roe, 410 U.S. at 221.
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tice White preferred the latter course of action, but remained
open to the possibility that Anglo-American tradition considered consensual sodomy an activity that should not be regulated. Unfortunately, he framed the inquiry in a biased and
anachronistic way by asking only whether "homosexual sodomy" was historically protected. He concluded the inquiry in a
dismissive manner when he said that gay people's liberty claim
was "at best, facetious."84
If one can edit out the antihomosexual slant, the inquiry
itself was consistent with the jurisprudence of original meaning. Justice White could easily have written a more judicious
opinion upholding the Georgia sodomy law. Such an opinion
would have started with the presumption that the burden is on
the challenger, Mr. Hardwick, to demonstrate through historical as well as logical evidence, that consensual sodomy is an activity implicit in the concept of ordered liberty according to our
legal tradition. The fact that almost all the states made the
crime against nature a serious offense in their earlier criminal
codes would render Hardwick's burden even higher. One might
contrast marriage, strongly protected against state intrusion in
the nineteenth century, with nonmarital sodomy, regulated in
almost all the states. Marriage is a zone of privacy implicit in
the Anglo-American traditions of ordered liberty, and this provides a sufficient justification for the privacy protected in Griswold. Hardwick's case was not as clear, and was at best doubtful-the Court needs a clearer historical record to invalidate
state legislation under the Due Process Clause. This approach
would have yielded the same result: Statute upheld; Eisenstadt
and Roe limited to their particular facts.
B. LAWRENCE AS A CRITIQUE OF ORIGINAL MEANING
JURISPRUDENCE

Even a more judiciously written original meaning opinion
would have been problematic in Hardwick, however. Indeed,
Hardwick illustrates several of the problems with originalism
as a constitutional methodology.8 5 It does not constrain judicial
84. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
85. For criticisms of original meaning jurisprudence, see Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHi. L. REV. 1057 (1990); Mark V. Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96
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discretion, poses unanswerable questions, and is not the most
legitimate means for discerning constitutional meaning in a
polity where the citizenship line has been socially redrawn.
1. Indeterminacy
One problem with original meaning jurisprudence is its indeterminacy; an indeterminate methodology does not constrain
the interpreter. The historical mise en scne for 1868 (and even
more for 1789) is very hard for historians to reconstruct in all
its complexity. It is even harder for Supreme Court Justices,
who are, at best, amateur historians. Hardwick reflects the
genuine risks of historical error when judges engage in lawoffice history. Law-office history typically searches for historical
fragments supporting one side or another of a legal dispute.
This is an inherently bad way of doing history. As Professor
Martin Flaherty insists, competent legal history is not possible
unless the interpreter understands the intellectual context of
the period as well as the on-point details.86
Drawing from amicus briefs filed by the Cato Institute and
by several eminent historians of sexuality, Lawrence concluded
that Hardwick reflected a poor job of historical analysis. 7 For
example, Hardwick was wrong to view "homosexual sodomy" as
the trans-historical object of Anglo-American crime against nature laws. Not only were male-female relations regulated by
such laws, but female-female relations were not subject to sodomy laws anywhere in the English-speaking world until the
twentieth century. Indeed, the concept of "homosexual" anything did not emerge in western civilization until the end of the
nineteenth century.8 Almost all of the reported sodomy proseHARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). Responses to these criticisms and newer defenses of
originalism include Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 849 (1989).
86. Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite"in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 550-56 (1995); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most DangerousBranch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1747-55 (1996) (applying a rigorous historicism to criticize amateur superficial accounts by leading legal
scholars).
87. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477-82 (2003); Brief for the
Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9-17, 22-30,
Lawrence (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Cato Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of History in Support of Petitioners at 3-19, id. [hereinafter Historians'

Briefl.
88. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2478-79; see Historians' Brief, supra note 87,
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cutions from the nineteenth century involved nonconsensual or
public conduct by men preying on weaker children, women, or
other men.89 In short, the focus of crime against nature laws
was neither homosexual nor consensual activities as far as one
can discern from the historical record. Thus, Justice White's
"strong" claim that American laws criminalizing consensual
"homosexual sodomy" have "ancient roots" was, "at best, facetious" as a matter of serious historiography.
As Justice Kennedy concluded, the historical analysis in
Hardwick was "overstated."90 He then recognized that there are
powerful moral authorities that condemn homosexual behavior
as "immoral," including authorities in the Roman Catholic
Church, the Justice's own faith. 91 But the duty of the Court,
Justice Kennedy opined, is "'to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.'"92 His subtle point was that Justice White was using history as a mechanism for writing his
own moral code into the Due Process Clause. 93
Significantly, Justice Scalia's scorched earth dissenting
opinion said nothing substantial in defense of the falsified history in Hardwick. Instead, he argued that none of the falsified
history was material, for the only relevant fact is that sodomy,
of all sorts, was traditionally a crime in American history. 94
Even a jurist as careful as Justice Scalia missed a few points in
the historical record, such as the fact that conduct between two
women was not a crime in the nineteenth century, did not become a crime in most states until well into the twentieth century, and was almost never enforced even after it technically
at 6-11; Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 9-10. The Cato Brief also noted that before 1879, no state sodomy law regulated the oral sex Michael Hardwick was
charged with committing. Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 12.
89. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479; see Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 10-12.
90. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)
(plurality opinion)).
93. This subtle point is made clearer by the next paragraph in Justice
Kennedy's opinion, which quotes Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion
and its invocation of "Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards." Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 2472.
As he did with Justice White, Justice Kennedy delivered a double rebuke to
the former Chief Justice: His sweeping historical statements were both inaccurate and sectarian. Because its materials are so pliable, originalism not only
fails to constrain the biased judge, but also can be a mechanism for importing
bias into constitutional decision making. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
94. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2493-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

1048

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1021

became a crime in most states. 95 Again, the search for a pre-

ferred result blinded even the brightest jurist to the evidence.
There is another problem with the ability of original meaning to constrain subsequent interpreters. Originalism's deployment depends upon the level of generality at which one interrogates the past. Even in the case of consensual sodomy, one
can get whatever answer one wants by how one poses the question. In Lawrence, Harris County, Texas asked: Would the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment have intended that
consensual sodomy be a protected liberty under their amendment? 6 No. The Cato Institute's Brief asked a different question. The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to give Americans clear notice of what duties the law required of them, to
protect their freedom of the body and of the home, and to avoid
class legislation. Did Texas undermine these purposes by arresting Lawrence and Garner? 97 Yes.

Which question is "truer" to original meaning? I am not
sure. Authors of directives intend that agents carry out their
specific expectations, but they also intend that agents apply
their directives with an eye to the purpose of those directives.
The practice of the Court has often been to pose original meaning questions at a high level of generality. If you ask the question with the level of specificity Harris County did, Brown and
Griswold were wrongly decided. No one is willing to overrule
these cases, and almost no one is willing to deny that they were
constitutional triumphs. So how can an original meaning theorist tell the rest of us when to deploy his theory instead of deploying a Brown-like approach?
2. Changed Circumstances
Eminent constitutional thinkers have taken the position
that the Framers of the Constitution and the Reconstruction
Amendments did not "mean" to bind future generations to the
specific expectations they had when their work was ratified by
"We the People."99 The Framers understood and accepted that
95. See Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 10-12.
96. Brief for Respondent Harris County, Texas at 8-12, Lawrence (No. 02102). The State of Texas, the nominal defendant in the case, did not file a
brief.
97. Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 18-30.
98. CHARLES L. BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 7-30 (1969); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 170-71 (1990); Alexander
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future generations would find their constitutional purposes
best fulfilled in unpredictable and unforeseen settings. This
suggests a second problem with originalism-the inevitability
of significantly changed circumstances. Once social, economic,
or normative conditions have changed in ways that affect an issue, not only is originalism less attractive, it is also unworkable. There is no longer any possibility of posing the questions
neutrally, and the methodology becomes both incapable of constraining interpreters (as argued above) and quite capable of
constitutional wackiness.
In 1868, there was no concept of homosexuality, and it was
possible to believe that only a few demonic individuals were
sodomites. In 2003, we are all sodomites, and homosexuality is
now understood as a sexual orientation and not a terrible moral
or medical disease. These new social facts have got to affect the
issue posed in Hardwick and Lawrence. For precisely this reason, an originalist can coherently pose Harris County's question in ways that generate the Cato Briefs answer: If the
Framers knew that America would become a nation of wellfunctioning sodomites and openly gay citizens, would they have
wanted the government to remain free to pry into these people's bedrooms? Would the Framers believe that sodomy laws
comport with "due process of law" if the experts were all agreed
that such laws had no effect on the level of sodomy in a jurisdiction, were used primarily as excuses for police brutality and
private blackmail, and created a terror regime for responsible
and productive citizens of the community? If the Framers had
known that in the twentieth century sodomy laws would justify
the antihomosexual American Kulturkampf of 1946-69 (a precise parallel to the antihomosexual Nazi Kulturkampf of 193345), would they have believed the laws were a valid exercise of
state power? Surely not.
Conversely, if you present the changed circumstances differently from the way I have, you can pose the Cato Institute's
question in a way that generates Harris County's result. Traditionalists would say that in 2003 too many of us are sodomites-but most are ashamed of that fact; homosexuality is at
best an unfortunate condition, like alcoholism. Many traditionalists also consider homosexuality contagious in some way.
Unless the polity takes a strong moral (and criminal) stance
M. Bickel, The Original Understandingof the Segregation Decisions, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 62-65 (1955); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof
OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 903-04 (1985).
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against bad conduct, it will spread to vulnerable Americans,
especially young people.99 If our updated Framers believed
those new "facts," they might say "no" to the question whether
Americans ought to be free to engage in consensual intimacies
with other adults in their own homes. The general purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment, they can argue, was not to protect
people whose conduct undermines the fabric of society.
There is no end to this mind game called original meaning.
3.

Legitimacy and Evolving Citizenship

The third problem with originalism has to do with the legitimacy of state action. The Framers assumed as universal
human truths some propositions that are now considered morally squalid, and not binding on us today. Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in Dred Scott is a classic application of original meaning, but it has been discredited because it applied or found 100a
squalid original intent-the immoral institution of slavery.
To be sure, Dred Scott was overridden by the Reconstruction
Amendments, but the Framers of those amendments assumed
that de jure racial segregation was required by the nature of
things, and that women should not participate in the public
sector and should tend to their natural duties of raising children. Those propositions are no longer morally or politically acceptable.
This argument is not simply an iteration of the changed
circumstances problem, for it goes to the normative foundation
of neutral judicial review, not just to its attainability. Dred
Scott held that people of color do not count for purposes of
American constitutionalism, and Plessy v. Ferguson and related
apartheid precedents amounted to almost the same thing.0 1
The Court in Bradwell v. Illinois assumed that women do not
count for purposes of American constitutionalism.' Once people of color and women asserted serious claims to equal citizenship, and American politics substantially accepted those claims,
99.

Cf. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (analogizing homosexuality to "measles" and suggesting that people afflicted with "homosexuality," like people afflicted with measles, can be constitutionally subjected to "quarantine regulations" to protect "others who do not presently have" the condition).
100. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406-13 (1857).
101. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), overruled by Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
102. 83 U.S. 130, 132-33 (1872) (upholding a statute that barred women
from practicing law).
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an overruling of Plessy and Bradwell was not only constitutionally acceptable but was constitutionally necessary. The composition of whom the Supreme Court recognized as "Ve the People" had to change. For reasons explored below, a national
politics where people of color and women are participants cannot tolerate laws segregating people on grounds of race or sex.
Once people of color and women successfully insisted upon
being considered citizens participating in our nation's pluralism, the normative foundation for following the narrow view of
the Framers' original meaning was undermined. The Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment accepted separate sphere norms
for both women and people of color-women to assure the perpetuation of humankind and people of color to assure the purity
of the white race. Such an ideology cannot survive the flourishing of women and people of color as equal citizens whose engagement in the public sphere is welcome and productive.
Thus, one might conclude that once an identity-based social
movement has achieved some success in transforming norms
related to its group members, the original expectations of longdeparted constitutional Framers become at least partially obsolete. For this reason, the Supreme Court has openly abandoned
an original intent methodology in the race and sex discrimination cases. Should it do the same in LGBT rights cases?
C. LAWRENCE AND A LEGAL PROCESS ROLE FOR HISTORY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

None of the Justices in Lawrence took the position that history becomes irrelevant once identity norms have changed. A
wide array of progressive or liberal, as well as conservative,
constitutional scholars would agree. They have coined an assortment of metaphors for thinking about original constitutional meaning once norms as well as other circumstances have
changed. Bruce Ackerman calls the process synthesis: The current interpreter must synthesize the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment with the transformative constitutional
moment of the New Deal."' Mark Tushnet terms the process
translation: The current interpreter must translate the nineteenth century norms of equal protection and liberty into the

103. Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE
L.J. 453, 527-36 (1989) (explaining the notion of synthesis and applying it to
Brown and Plessy).
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modern regulatory state era.104
A more traditional legal approach that explains Justice
Kennedy's use of history in Lawrence is legal process theory.
Synthesizing jurisprudence of the New Deal period and the advent of the modern regulatory state, Professors Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks maintained that legal interpreters should apply a
law to carry out its purpose, unless inconsistent with the text
or binding precedent.'0 5 The legal process approach, as they articulated it, is both descriptive and normative. It seeks to understand the purpose of a particular legal enterprise, as its authors understood it. 10 It also applies that purpose to current

circumstances with a critical eye: Which application best carries out the legal purpose? (This is the core purposive inquiry.)
Which fits best with other developments in the law? 10 7 (This is a
coherence inquiry.) Is the best application one that the text and
precedent can support? 08 (This is a rule of law inquiry.)
Justice Kennedy, an alumnus of the Hart and Sacks Legal
Process course, followed this methodology in Lawrence."°9 One
primary purpose of the Due Process Clause, as the Framers
saw it and as the Court has applied it, is to protect people from
"unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other
private places," and to assure people "an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct."" ° It is deeply inconsistent with this Fourteenth Amendment liberty principle for the state to intrude into
104. Tushnet, supra note 85, at 800-01; see Brest, supra note 85; Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171 n.32 (1993) (listing
constitutional scholars who deploy the translation metaphor).
105. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1124-25, 1374-80 (Wil-

liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (tentative ed. 1958). Hart
and Sacks developed their theory as a matter of statutory interpretation, but
both contemporary and subsequent scholars applied the same philosophy to
generate theories of judicial review. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, An Historical and CriticalIntroduction to THE LEGAL PROCESS, in id.
at civ-cxxxiv (discussing constitutional theories applying the legal process approach).
106. HART & SACKS, supra note 105, at 1377-80.
107. Id. at 1376-77, 1380.
108. Id. at 1374-76 (text); id. at 1379 (precedent).
109. Five Justices of the current Court are alumni or alumnae of the Hart
and Sacks Legal Process course at Harvard: Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
110. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003); see Cato Brief, supra
note 87, at 5-8 (providing an explication of freedom for intrusion as the purpose the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment espoused).
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the bedrooms of consenting adults engaged in intimate activities. Another purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to monitor the tendency of states to create social outcasts."' Justice
O'Connor applied this anti-caste principle to invalidate a law
that had dozens of collateral effects for lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals in Texas. "'A legislative classification that threatens
the creation of an underclass ...cannot be reconciled with' the
Equal Protection Clause.""' Justice Kennedy recognized the seriousness of Justice O'Connor's analysis and suggested that the
liberty and anti-caste principles were interconnected in Lawrence."3 The anti-caste principle could not be deeply enforced
without also enforcing the liberty principle to divest the nation
of consensual sodomy laws." 4
In light of the original purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hardwick is doubly problematic. A majority of the
Hardwick Justices were unable to understand how the sexual
intimacies entailed in sodomy were important for gay people,
just as the nonprocreative intimacies were important to the
married couple in Griswold. Once LGBT people are recognized
as decent citizens whose lives count in our society, there is no
good reason why the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty principle
should not protect their intimacies just as it protects the intimacies of married (Griswold) and unmarried (Eisenstadt)
straight couples. If Hardwick was wrong in applying the liberty
principle, its mistake was compounded by its reasons. By unnecessarily focusing on "homosexual sodomy," Justice White's
111. On the anti-caste principle as key to the Framers' original expectations, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 13-39 (1988).

112. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-

ment) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)).
"Our Constitution ...neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487

(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
113. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2482.
114. Justice Kennedy reasoned:

If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection
reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.
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opinion not only revealed a bias in its application of the liberty
principle, but sanctioned (and perhaps encouraged) state and
private discrimination that exacerbated sodomy laws' tension
with the Fourteenth Amendment's anti-caste principle.
None of this reasoning was persuasive to Justice Scalia
(himself an alumnus of the Legal Process class at Harvard). He
abandoned Justice White's biased rhetoric and error-laden history, but strongly disputed the majority's historiography. The
historical debate between Justices Kennedy and Scalia is, on
the whole, not a debate over the facts. 5 Like the majority, the
dissent provides what I consider an honest account, along the
following lines: However you reinterpret the history of sodomy
laws, it is apparent that nonprocreative sex was not something
that Americans accepted as valuable or fundamental at the
time of Reconstruction." 6 Even during the twentieth century,
when Americans came to accept contraception as a valid means
of avoiding the procreative consequences of penile-vaginal sex,
there remained a normative aversion to other forms of nonprocreative sex, namely anal sex (traditional "sodomy") and oral
sex (added to state sodomy laws after 1879). Indeed, there were
203 reported prosecutions for consensual adult homosexual
sodomy between 1880 and 1995, the same period when contraception, and
even abortion, became commonplace in American
7
society.1

Justice Kennedy's account is, in my opinion, equally honest
and has the added virtue of understanding the history of sodomy laws through the purposive framework of the Fourteenth
Amendment." When the amendment was adopted in 1868,
crime against nature laws were not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's core principles and purposes. The laws did
not clash with the liberty principle because they were applied

115. Indeed, like Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia closely follows the factual
account developed in the Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 9-17, which was in turn
taken from William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography,1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 631, cited in Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480, and ESKRIDGE,
GAYLAW, supra note 14, cited in Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dis-

senting).
116. The account in the text is drawn from Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2492-94
(Scalia, J., dissenting).

117.

ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW,

supra note 14, at 375, cited in Lawrence, 123 S.

Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

118. The account in the text is drawn from Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 247782, which is the opinion of the Court.
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almost exclusively to coercive sexuality." 9 The laws were originally not at odds with the anti-caste principle because they

were not associated with any class of people. It was not until
well into the twentieth century that sodomy became a metonym
for a new category of person, the "homosexual," and that sodomy laws were widely applied to activities between consenting

adults, in increasing violation of the liberty principle. 2 ° Indeed,
sodomy laws were a basis for a massive antihomosexual Kul-

turkampf during the McCarthy era, a state campaign eerily
reminiscent of the Nazi's persecution of gay people and entirely
at odds with the anti-caste principle.'

The core historical disagreement within the Court entailed
the Justices' different interpretations of the Kulturkampf and
its aftermath. Justice Kennedy was attentive to the state's increasing, and historically recent, persecution of consenting gay

adults as the focus of sodomy laws." 2 He also found relevant
the judgment of neutral legal experts-the American Law Institute (recommended in 1955) and the Wolfenden Committee
(recommended in 1957)-that the more modern trend of enforcing sodomy laws against consenting adults violated the liberty

principle and had malign rule-of-law effects as well."' In short,
this state-led campaign of persecution hurt good people for no

good reason. Justice Scalia understood the Kulturkampf period
as a confirmation of Hardwick's "conclusion that homosexual

sodomy is not a fundamental124 right 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'

119. The laws presented a due process problem of adequate notice because
they only named the "abominable and detestable crime against nature" as
their object. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 21 (1973) (per curiam). The
statutory language had well-accepted common law meanings, however, suggesting that these notice problems were not fatal. Id. Note that the accepted
common law gloss on the crime against nature further ensured that the laws
would not be applied to consensual encounters in private places. Cato Brief,
supra note 87, at 12, followed in Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479. A man could not
be convicted of the crime against nature without evidence of penetration by his
penis into another man's anus. Id. Moreover, such evidence could not be based
upon the testimony of a sexual partner who was his legal "accomplice." Id.
Conversely, a man could be convicted by evidence presented by a sexual partner who did not consent (such as a woman or man being anally raped) or who
was incapable of consent (a minor girl or boy). See id. at 11-12.
120. See Cato Brief, supra note 87, at 12-14.
121. See id. at 13; ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 57-97.
122. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479-80.
123. Id. at 2480-81.
124. Id. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Both Justices Kennedy and Scalia not only engaged the
history of sodomy law evolution both factually and judiciously,
but were also able to get (partly) beyond the level-of-generality
debate noted above. Does a due process claim have to show that
a particular conduct was considered off-limits to state regulation in 1868? Or can the claimant rely on American law's protection of a more general category of conduct? 121 In Lawrence,
Justice Kennedy does not claim that consensual sodomy is a
"fundamental right" affirmatively supported by traditional legal protection, nor does Justice Scalia dispute that consensual
sodomy in private places was unregulated until well into the
twentieth century. Their dispute is openly normative: Given a
history as to which there is now much agreement, how should it
be read? Does the history justify, or help justify, overruling not
only a precedent of the Court, but also invalidating consensual
sodomy laws in thirteen states?
The norm on which one's reading of the history turns is, ultimately, the proper status of people who presumptively commit the "homosexual sodomy" that Texas criminalized. While it
may be too simple to say that Justice Kennedy read the history
from the perspective of gay people, and Justice Scalia read it
from the perspective of TFV people, it helps frame their different approaches to the same legal materials. Following Hardwick, Justice Scalia read the history in a way that helped explain why Texas might rationally have adopted the
Homosexual Conduct Law. His baseline was the deference to
the normal political process the Court usually affords economic
and much social or morals legislation. 126 Following Romer, Justice Kennedy's baseline was the norm of tolerable sexual variation, a norm largely adopted in American politics and law in response to the LGBT social movement. 127
The foregoing contrast shows yet another way that the
Court's reading of history contributed to its case that the Homosexual Conduct Law violates the original meaning of the
125. This was the debate in Michael H. v. Gerard D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-30
(1989). In Lawrence, the debate would have been something like this: As he

did in Michael H., Justice Scalia would have gone to the most specific level
available and argued that sodomy of any kind cannot be a "fundamental right"
because it was regulated in 1868. See id. at 127 & n.6. As he and Justice
O'Connor did in Michael H., Justice Kennedy would have been open to consid-

ering a broader category, like "conduct in the home that does not harm third
parties." See id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
126. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

127. See id. at 2482.
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Fourteenth Amendment: If, as a matter of social fact, homosexuality is a tolerable condition that poses no discernible
threat to the community, then the nineteenth-century history
of sodomy nonenforcement outside of predatory contexts had it
right, and the twentieth century's episodically hysterical enforcement was profoundly unproductive. Once gay people are
understood as rather normal folks who engage in sexual conduct for most of the same reasons that straight people do, then
it is hard to say that they should not have the same protection
from state intrusion into their homes and relations that
straight people enjoy. Thus, the Texas law was inconsistent
with the liberty principle of the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, Texas's focus on "homosexual conduct" alone, and the extensive civil consequences of being a presumptive "homosexual
sodomite," is invidious as well as unproductive-a cheap way
for Texas to send a moral message against sodomy, but without
subjecting mainstream heterosexual sodomites to potential
penalties. Demonizing a decent group of citizens is inconsistent
with the anti-caste principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.
My account of how history can support Lawrence is similar
to the accounts that others have posited for the Court's race
and sex discrimination cases. Unlike Lawrence, Brown v. Board
of Education12 8 dodged the historical issues. Most historians
have been skeptical that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment supported Brown, largely because the Reconstruction Congress and legislators, by their words and by
their statutes, seemed to accept segregated schools and other
institutions. 29 Pressed by Justice Frankfurter to provide some
historical justification, his law clerk Alex Bickel examined the
evidence and concluded that the Framers did not expect racial
segregation to end immediately but were open to its ending after the country assimilated the freed slaves as equal citizens. 3 °
Bickel's account of the history has been an appealing one, even
to constitutional conservatives, because it provides a link between the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning and
America's normative consensus that racial variation is benign
128.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

129. E.g.,
RAOUL
BERGER,
GOVERNMENT
BY
JUDICIARY:
THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 22-27, 117-27 (1977);
EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869

(1990).
130. Bickel, supra note 98; see also BORK, supra note 98 (agreeing that
Brown was inconsistent with the Framers' specific intent, but not their general intent, i.e., the overall equality purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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and, therefore, that it is irrational to use race as a reason to
segregate people as a matter of law.
III. LAWRENCE, REGIME SHIFTS, AND STARE DECISIS
The previous part argued that a regime shift such as that
initiated in Romer and completed in Lawrence requires the
Court to apply the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning
with some attention to the perspective and citizenship of the
newly recognized social group. I now suggest a similar proposition for the role of stare decisis: Once a regime shift has occurred, previous decisions must be reconceived or even reconsidered if they are tainted by the rejected norm. If a social fact
or norm is the starting point or a key premise in precedents AF, and the Supreme Court finds in precedent G that the social
fact is false or the norm has been superseded, then stare decisis
does not apply with much or any force for precedents A-F, even
if they are not overruled in the new precedent.' Indeed, lower
courts--ordinarily required to follow the reasoning as well as
results of Supreme Court opinions-will sometimes ignore or
read those opinions narrowly once the Court has announced a
regime shift. On the other hand, it might be the case that the
social fact or norm is a necessary assumption only of precedent
A, and that precedents B-F can survive, but perhaps in narrowed form.
Brown did not explicitly overrule any precedent of the
Court, but it implicitly (and unmistakably) rejected a foundational proposition followed by a number of the Court's earlier
precedents, namely, that the states could treat racial variation
as so malignant or should treat it as significant, such that they
could order different races to be segregated. 3 2 Brown treated
131. This analysis is consistent with standard accounts of stare decisis and
the conditions under which precedent can be overruled. See HART & SACKS,
supra note 105, at 545-629. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988) (describing the process of over-

ruling precedents).
132. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown rejected "[any language in
Plessy" inconsistent with the Court's analysis. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
Warren did not have to say more because Plessy's holding had already been
overruled in Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950), which interpreted the Interstate Commerce Act to prohibit race discrimination, including
segregation, on railroad trains. Brown surely had the effect of overruling cases
like Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899),
and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), both of which assumed the legality

of state segregation in allowing local discretion to make decisions about local
segregated schools. As became clear in the wake of Brown, Warren's opinion
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African-Americans as equal citizens entitled to dignified and
equal treatment as participants in the political community.
Once that norm became the law of the land, in a unanimous
Supreme Court decision, the constitutional world changed.
Lower courts understood that their duty was to reason from the
Brown norm even if it meant departing from circuit court or
even Supreme Court precedent. Although its formal reasoning
focused almost entirely on segregated education, it is for this
reason that lower courts treated Brown as cutting deeply
against any form of apartheid.'33
The Supreme Court itself applied that idea in McLaughlin
v. Florida.3 4 Florida made it a crime for an unmarried couple of
different races to cohabit.' 35 The state defended its law by reference to Pace v. Alabama,'36 where the Supreme Court had upheld a law enhancing penalties for adultery and fornication
ht'
Justice White's
when the couple was of different races.
McLaughlin opinion gave short shrift to Pace on the ground
that it "represent[ed] a limited view of the Equal Protection
Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court."'3 8 The subsequent decisions were, essentially, Brown. Once the Court had signaled that racial variation
was not, itself, a rational basis for state policy and that thirdparty effects could not be a rational basis if they were based on
racial prejudice, then Pace lost all its stare decisis effect. The
Court's landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia39 became a
constitutional gimme.
The Court repeated the same pattern in the sex discrimination cases. Before 1971, the Court had never struck down
statutory sex discrimination on equal protection grounds. Responding directly to the women's rights movement and its
.137

also effectively abrogated state and federal circuit court decisions allowing racial segregation outside the education context. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
133. In a series of per curiam opinions, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed lower court judgments striking down race-based segregation in public
beaches, Mayor of Balt. City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (mem.), municipal
golf courses, Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (mem.), city buses,
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.), and so forth.
134. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
135. Id. at 184.
136. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
137. Id. at 585.
138. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188.
139. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down laws barring different-race marriages).
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overwhelming political success, the Court did so frequently in
the 1970s. The new norm was that sex is usually not a rational
basis for state policies. The old norm allowing states to recognize separate spheres for women and men was repudiated, but
without overruling prior precedents. With one exception, 140 the
Court just ignored the earlier precedents 4 The lower courts
got the message, and the earlier decisions disappeared. They
died and went to precedent Hell.
A notable feature of Justice Kennedy's Lawrence opinion is
that Hardwick got a more decent burial than Pace and the pre1971 sex discrimination precedents had received. This is good.
McLaughlin would have been a much stronger decision if Justice White had explained how Brown repudiated as false and
pernicious Pace's essential social norm, that racial variation or
mixing can be malignant.142 Once it was accepted as a matter of
normative fact that different-race relationships were benign
and had no public effects beyond the illegitimate consequences
of private prejudice, it was a serious violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty principle to make them a crime. Once it
was accepted as a matter of normative fact that people of color
are equal citizens and that white racial purity is an irrational
state goal, the Fourteenth Amendment's anti-caste principle
required the invalidation of McLaughlin's discrimination. Under the proper analysis, therefore, Pace was no longer tenable
as a precedent, and was even inconsistent with the original
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, as understood in light
of current social facts and norms.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lawrence heartily objected to the majority's treatment of precedent. His main claim
was that Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter gave none of
the stare decisis benefit to Hardwick that they had given a decade before to save Roe. He was right about that, and he was
140. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975), Justice White's opinion for the Court overruled Hoyt v. Florida,368 U.S. 57 (1961), but with little
more reasoning than his opinion in McLaughlin had given for rejecting Pace.
141. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating a statute prohibiting bars from serving 3.2% beer to eighteen- to twenty-year-old males but
not to females). Craig ignored but implicitly overruled Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948), which allowed Michigan to bar women from serving as
bartenders. Craig, 429 U.S. at 20 & n.23.
142. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
143. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2488-91 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia included Justice O'Connor in his charge that the majority was hypocritically ignoring Casey's analysis of stare decisis. That inclu-
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even righter when he complained that Hardwick had generated
a fair
amount
of social and legislative reliance that the Court
•
1144
ignored. It was also fair to complain that the Lawrence Court
jettisoned one of the key points made in Casey. The joint opinion in Casey announced that stare decisis carries greater weight
"whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls
the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution."14 5 Hardwick can easily be said to call the contending sides of a national controversy to accept the mandate
that it is up to the states to decide whether to criminalize consensual sodomy.
Good for Justice Scalia. But he missed the take-home point
made by the Casey joint opinion, both in its reasoning and in its
result: Stare decisis in identity politics cases is a function of the
social consensus as regards the trait or conduct involved in the
case.' 4' The Casey joint opinion contrasted the Brown Court's
willingness to abrogate the reasoning in Plessy with its own
unwillingness to overrule Roe.' As I have argued above, Plessy
lost its precedential force once public norms had shifted in the
United States.14 8 If racial variation is or must be understood as
benign, it is no longer rational for the state to require racial
segregation. There was no comparable norm shift from Roe to
Casey. If anything, the norm that women are equal citizens
whose interests must be taken into account by constitutional
law was even stronger in 1992 than it had been in 1973, and
sion was patently unfair, as Justice O'Connor, alone on the Court, was scrupu-

lous about stare decisis. Consistent with Casey, she declined to overrule
Hardwick. Id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Consistent
with Romer, however, she voted to strike down the Texas law on equal protection grounds. Id. at 2484-87.
144. See id. at 2490-91 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Not only was the
Clinton Administration's statutory exclusion of gay people from military service in 1993 explicitly premised and defended on the ground that gay people
are prone to commit illegal consensual sodomy, see 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (Supp.
1994); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1129 & n.4, 1136 (9th
Cir. 1997), but state antigay hiring policies, presumptions against child custody, and adoption rules have been premised and defended on the same basis,
see ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 62, at 786-800, 869-72, 879-82 (providing extensive documentation of antigay employment rules and their defenses);
id. at 1163-76, 1188-94 (documenting antigay family law rules).
145. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866-67 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
146. See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 62, at 863-64.
147. Id. at 862-64.
148. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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the right to choose an abortion had gained a powerful new constitutional dimension: Not only do women have a liberty interest in controlling the timing of their childbearing, they also
have an equality interest because this decision bears upon
them in ways that it can never bear upon, or be understood by,
149
men.
Sympathetically understood, the Casey analysis lends support to Justice Kennedy's thoughtful revisiting of Hardwick.
Like Brown and unlike Casey, Lawrence overruled a precedent
that had been overtaken by a normative revolution in the
United States. Like Brown and unlike Casey, Lawrence was a
moment when the Court was engaging in a regime shift that in
fact required it to overrule precedent. That is what a regime
shift is all about. Indeed, this is the reason why the Court was
right to confront Hardwick head on and not to accept Justice
O'Connor's attractive invitation to respect both stare decisis
and equal gay citizenship by striking down the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law on equal protection rather than due process grounds. Justice O'Connor's approach would not only have
left most sodomy laws on the books, but would have left Hardwick in place as a symbol of permanent gay inequality. Hardwick's "continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons."1 50 It also demeaned the Court, whose
legitimacy was perpetually stained so long as Hardwick was on
the books.15 '
So Brown, Casey, and Lawrence are all consistent with a
meta-principle of stare decisis in identity-politics cases: Once
national citizenship has expanded to include a new identity
group, and social norms have changed to accept the group's defining trait as at least tolerable, the Court ought to presume in
favor of expanding the liberties and contracting the exclusions
suffered by the once-denigrated group. The Court should do
this not simply because it is just, or even simply because it contributes to the orderly evolution of our pluralist system-but
the Court must do this for its own survival as a neutral arbiter
of the rule of law. A Court perceived as racist, sexist, or (now)
homophobic is a Court that cannot do the business the Constitution charges it with and cannot command the respect of the
lower court judges under its supervision. It will be a Court be-

149.
150.
151.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 868-69.
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003).
Id. at 2482-83.
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set with nasty charges, political attacks, and mutinies by lower
court judges, until it accommodates the new group.
The foregoing analysis leaves some questions unanswered.
An important qualification is that identity politics entails more
than just long-subordinated minority groups. Every identitybased social movement has generated a countermovement that
is equally identity based-the states' rights and white supremacy politics in the wake of Brown,"' the anti-ERA and pro-life
politics following Roe,"' and the TFV politics responding to the
LGBT rights movement.' Social movement theory also provides a way to understand both the content and the passion of
Justice Scalia's Lawrence dissent: There are powerful issues of
citizenship and identity on both sides of the case, and in such
instances the Court should leave culture clashes to the political
process.15 Anything more is illegitimate judicial activism that
will harm the minority groups the Justices are trying to protect.
Indeed, the political fallout from both Brown and Roe suggests that even regime-shifting precedents cannot implement
new norms when identity politics is evenly balanced. In Brown
II, the Court rejected the Inc. Fund's request for immediate implementation of the antiapartheid rule of Brown 1.156 Although
the Court gave greater bite to Brown If remedies between 1963
and 1971, after 1971 a Court more responsive to Northern opposition to busing curtailed Brown II remedies." 7 A moderate
politics of preservation has been able to limit federal court
regulation of local public education. One consequence of lim152. See Eskridge, Twentieth Century, supra note 20, at 2096-2113.
153. See id. at 2138-59.
154. See id. at 2179-94.
155. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
that homosexuals should "promot[e] their agenda through normal democractic
means").
156. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
157. For examples of the Court expanding Brown II remedies see McDaniel
v. Baresi, 402 U.S. 309 (1971) and Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). For examples of the Court curtailing Brown II
remedies see Crawford v. Board of Education of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527
(1982) and Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
158. The moderate version of the politics of preservation rejects explicitly
racist rhetoric but favors policies that allow either segregation or resegregation as a matter of private choices. Richard Nixon was elected President essentially on this platform. See DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE
WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 326-31, 349-51, 386-99 (1995);
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ited judicial intervention and patterns of white flight has been
a steady resegregation of American public education.5 9
The reactions to Roe were even more dramatic. The Supreme Court's decision gave a tremendous boost to the nascent
pro-life social movement.' Although that countermovement
has not been able to persuade Americans that the fetus is a
human person, it has persuaded most Americans that the
choice to have an abortion is one that the state can regulate in
many respects. 6 ' The success of the pro-life movement was apparent in Casey. Although the joint opinion reaffirmed the "essential holding" of Roe, it abandoned the trimester framework
and applied Justice O'Connor's undue burden test to uphold a
state law requiring waiting periods, informational disclosures,
and (for minors) parental
consent before exercising one's choice
162
to have an abortion.

IV. LAWRENCE AND A CONSERVATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE OF TOLERANCE
This part considers exactly what the Court was accomplishing as a normative matter. The answer involves an inquiry
DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON'S CIVIL RIGHTS 15-43 (2001). Nixon's four appointments to the Court (Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.) implemented that platform limiting Brown II remedies after 1973. See JEFFRIES,
supra note 54, at 302-331.
159. See GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD
UNIV., RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1999), http://www.civilrights
project.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Resegregation AmericanSchools99.pdf.
160. See DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE
RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: FROM POLITE TO FIREY PROTEST 51-60 (1994).
161. "Americans in general have embraced both the right to abortion declared by the Court as well as many restrictions Roe v. Wade allowed."
GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1996, at 114 (1997);
see id. at 112 (noting that at least 70% of respondents favored waiting periods,
required disclosures, parental consent, and spousal notification for women
seeking abortions); GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION
2002, at 20 (2003) (noting that 78% of respondents said abortion laws should
remain the same or be more strict).
162. The joint opinion authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens in reaffirming the essential
holding of Roe and striking down the state spousal notification law. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 911-22 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment, and dissenting in part). The Chief Justice and Justices
White, Scalia, and Thomas joined the joint opinion in upholding the remainder
of the law, as described in the text accompanying this note. Id. at 944-79
(Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
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into toleration. The new constitutional floor set by the RomerlLawrence regime shift is that states must treat homosexuality as a tolerable variation;implicitly, this new floor does
not require that states treat homosexuality as equivalent to
heterosexuality, but it does veto state discretion to treat LGBT
people as outlaws or degenerates. The political philosophy supporting that new floor is a jurisprudenceof tolerance. Underlying that jurisprudence is not only the moral philosophy notion
of tolerable variation, but also the political philosophy notion
that mutual toleration is necessary for the flourishing (or even
the survival) of a pluralist democracy.
A. LAWRENCE AND THE NORM OF TOLERABLE VARIATION

The results in Romer and Lawrence are consistent with the
norm that homosexuality is a tolerable sexual variation, and
their reasoning is more consistent with this norm than with the
more gay-friendly idea that homosexuality is a benign sexual
variation. Libertarian analyses of sodomy laws, from Jeremy
Bentham through H.L.A. Hart and Richard Posner, have traditionally distanced the protected conduct from standards of morality."3 Thus, a lot of disapproved conduct can be tolerated,
especially if it does not hurt other people. Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Lawrence treats homosexual conduct with careful respect, but also considerable moral distance.
A contrast makes this point. Justice Douglas's opinion for
the Court in Griswold protected the right of married couples to
use contraceptives. His opinion concluded with a lavish ode to
heterosexual marriage:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet
it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior

decisions.'

Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence concluded on a flatter tone: "The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve [lack of consent]. It does not involve public conduct or
prostitution ....The case does involve two adults who, with
full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
163. See, e.g., Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 535-38 (1989) (explaining

how moral views are separated from protected conduct).
164.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.' 65 This is the tone
of both tolerance and moral distance. To some it is a tone of
condescension: Straights have "sacred" and "noble" marriage;
"homosexuals" have a "lifestyle."
The distinction between tolerable and benign variation also
helps us to situate Romer and Lawrence in our constitutional
history and to understand the magnitude of the regime shift
these decisions created. Two rough analogies come to mind, and
they complement one another. The first analogy is to Roe, the
second is to Brown.
Like the Court's opinion in Lawrence, the Roe opinion protected the freedom of Americans to make sexual choices and
took no moral position on the value of different choices. The
pro-life movement vigorously maintained that Roe was wrongly
decided and that abortion was a malignant moral choice, essentially murder.'66 That countermovement was not able to persuade Americans that abortion is equivalent to murder; most
Americans agreed that an abortion was a tolerable moral
choice, such that the state could ordinarily not make it a crime.
But many or most agreed with the critics that abortionwas not
a benign or good moral choice, such that the state must support
or "promote" it. In Maher v. Roe,' the Supreme Court ruled
that it is perfectly constitutional for state medicaid programs to
exclude abortions even if they fund childbirths. Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court interpreted Roe as protecting women
against "unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy"-a freedom from
state "compulsion" that did not entitle women to have their
abortions paid for by the state. 16 "There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and
state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with

165. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
166. See BLANCHARD, supra note 160.
167. 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977). See also Maher's companion cases, Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (per curiam) (a municipal hospital providing
childbirth services was not constitutionally required to provide abortion services) and Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (interpreting Title XIX of the

Social Security Act to allow states to participate in Medicaid without funding
abortions). The Court followed and applied Maher to uphold a federal bar to
spending federal monies on abortions in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326

(1980).
168. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599600 (1977)).
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legislative policy."16 9 The state has wide latitude not to "promote abortion" by funding it, and Powell's opinion concluded
that this is precisely the sort of policy issue best left to the democratically elected legislators. 7 °
Maher encouraged pro-life activists to press for laws discouraging abortion as a choice, including requirements that
abortions be performed only after doctors obtain the written
consent of their patients, 7 ' and that the consent be "informed"
by pro-life information the doctors were required to provide.
The Supreme Court rebuffed early efforts but acquiesced in Casey. Although the joint opinion reaffirmed the "essential holding" of Roe, it applied the Maher undue burden test to uphold a
state law requiring waiting periods, informational disclosures,
and (for minors) parental
consent before exercising one's choice
72
to have an abortion.
It is only in retrospect that we can understand Brown as
representing the triumph of the NAACP's norm of benign racial
variation. Chief Justice Warren's decision tightly focused on
the importance of public education as a training ground for citizenship and the dignitary harms visited on black schoolchildren who were the obvious targets of segregation. 73 The decision said nothing about race as a presumptively inadmissible
classification across the board.'74 Immediately after Brown, the
Court had an opportunity to take that step. In Naim v. Naim,
the Virginia Supreme Court upheld that state's law making different-race marriage a crime. The Supreme Court remanded7
the case for the state court to reconsider in light of Brown.11
Virginia stuck to its original position, which was that differentrace marriage would yield a "mongrel race" and dilute the

169. Id. at 475. Powell contrasted a law barring schools from teaching
German, invalidated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), with a policy
of prescribing a curriculum that included English and excluded German without imposing a criminal sanction on those who do not follow such a prescribed
curriculum. Maher, 432 U.S. at 476-77.
170. Id. at 479-80; see id. at 481-82 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (same).
171. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67, 85 (1976)
(containing Missouri's version of such a law).
172. See supra note 162.
173. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
174. The Court simply held that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
175. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), vacating and remanding 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955).
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white race. 176 There could have been no clearer repudiation of
the idea that racial variation is benign, yet the Supreme Court
allowed the decision to stand. The apparent reason was the furious reaction in the South to Brown and the equivocal support
the Court was receiving from Congress and the President.
As time passed, however, the country moved toward the
NAACP's point of view. During the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, the high tide of liberalism in the United States, the
Court constitutionalized the norm that racial variation is benign. In McLaughlin v. Florida,"'the Court struck down a law
making it a crime for an unmarried couple of different races to
17 8
cohabit. The Court's landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia
finally disposed of the issue the Court had ducked in Naim v.
Naim. Chief Justice Warren's opinion not only ruled that the
state could not prohibit different-race marriage, but also established once and for all that race is a suspect classification."'
This latter point was a corollary of the Inc. Fund's view: If racial variation is benign, then state policy based on it is fishy
and presumptively derived from the racist philosophy of "white
supremacy," the announced policy of the Virginia miscegenation law.
Romer and Lawrence accomplished for LGBT people essentially what Brown accomplished for people of color and Roe accomplished for women: Homosexuality is a tolerable sexual
variation, and homosexual sodomy is tolerable conduct. Thus,
the state can neither declare that gay people are an outlaw
class, nor enforce an apartheid regime upon gay people.' What
176. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Va. 1956) (per curiam), appeal
dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
177. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
178. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
179. Id. at 12.
180. The term in the text does not suggest that the state's denial of jobs
and parental rights to LGBT people is equivalent to the violent regime of
apartheid in the South. I am using the term "apartheid" in its literal sense, as
an interlocking regime of legally enforced segregations. Women in the twentieth century were subjected to an apartheid of the household: The state made it
hard for them to obtain university educations and find well-paying jobs and
legally made it much more advantageous for the average woman to marry a
man-with the result that women were largely segregated from public life.
Gay people suffered under what I call an "apartheid of the closet," whereby the
state enforced a code of not only silence, but also forced performances of heterosexuality in its rules against sodomy, state employment of or military service by "homosexuals and other sex perverts," and custody by gay parents over
their own children. This argument is developed in ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra
note 14, at 17-80.
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comes next is not predictable. Parallel to the claims made by
people of color and their representatives in the NAACP, LGBT
communities and their representatives in Lambda Legal and
the ACLU maintain that homosexuality is a benign sexual
variation and that homosexual sodomy is benign conduct. Gay
is Good, not just Tolerable. Brown offers gay people hope that
this moral vision will prevail. Parallel to the claims made by
pro-life people and moderate segregationists, TFV communities
and their legal representatives maintain that homosexuality
and homosexual conduct are either bad or unfortunate variations from an excellent norm, procreative marriage. Gay is God
Awful and at most Tolerable. No promo homo. Casey offers traditionalists hope that this moral vision can prevail.
B. POLITICAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Lawrence majority had a good handle on traditional
legal materials, including original meaning and precedent.
There are two sides to the rule-of-law issues, however, and Justice Scalia capably articulated the dissenting point of view. At
the very least, the majority was exercising some discretion in
how it read the materials, with Justice O'Connor reading them
more narrowly and Justice Kennedy more broadly-but both
much more broadly in favor of gay rights than Justice Scalia.
Broad readings of the Fourteenth Amendment always put the
Supreme Court at some risk, and premature enunciations of
constitutional rights (as in Roe) can roil the political and the
judicial process for generations. On the other hand, excessively
stingy readings also put the Court at risk, for dismissive treatment of rights important to an increasingly significant minority
can embroil the Court in never-ending controversy (as in
Hardwick). In short, the Court in these identity-politics cases
must steer a careful course between Scylla (Roe) and Charybdis
(Hardwick).
So we return to the question: Why would the Lawrence majority read the legal materials in such a progay way? Were they
simply protecting a group because they and their elite friends
are wild about homosexuals as the cause du jour? Justice Scalia
says that this is exactly what the Court is doing."" Don't believe it. There is no reason to think that Sandra Day O'Connor
and Anthony Kennedy, staunchly conservative Republicans,

181. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2496-97 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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are pimps for the "homosexual agenda." A better theory is that
these Justices are apostles of toleration, and that they read the
Fourteenth Amendment to support that norm for a social group
consisting of decent Americans who have traditionally been despised by their neighbors and mistreated by the state. The best
theory, and one that complements the second, is a political theory, rooted in American history. It is not only consistent with,
but is suggested by, the original purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This theory provides a compass for the Supreme
Court to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis. The central point of
the political theory is that the Court should operate to lower
the stakes of identity politics and culture clashes. The Court's
moderating role is especially important when warring identity
groups threaten to radicalize politics.
The modern Constitution is premised upon the operation of
a democratic pluralism. Three features of our government are
key. One is that elected representatives who are accountable to
voters make most public policy, the representationfeature. At
the state and national level, representatives in two different
(and differently accountable) chambers have to approve proposals before they can become law. A second feature is the importance of groups. Parties contend for votes and loyalty, but so
do other kinds of groups, including identity-based groups like
LGBT people and TFV people. This is the pluralism feature of
our government. Finally, our representative democracy is enriched by the fact that most policy making is accomplished at
the state and local level. This federalism feature means that at
any given time people deeply unhappy with the policies followed by their home jurisdiction will have the opportunity to
move to friendlier states or cities.
Before the New Deal, most accounts of judicial review assumed that the Supreme Court and the judiciary had little or
no role to play in the operation of the democratic process. 182 Responding to the NAACP's stream of criminal procedure and voting cases, the New Deal Court suggested that it was prepared
to be a referee for the political process, not only (1) when the
process violated individual rights clearly protected in the
Constitution, but also (2) when local political elites sought to
182. Most theories simply focused on the Court's enforcement of objectively
identifiable rights. The most sophisticated theory focusing on judicial review
and the democratic process maintained that any kind of judicial activism
weakened the democratic process. James B. Thayer, The Originand Scope of
the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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lock in their power by excluding minorities from participation,
or (3) when laws were motivated by "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities" such that the ordinary political process
could not be relied on.'8 3 This theory suggests that the Supreme
Court should generally not strike down statutes that are the
product of a normally functioning democratic process, one
where all relevant groups participate freely (even if not with
equal success). Judicial review, under this theory, should be exceptional, limited to cases involving self-perpetuating majorities and minorities that are systematically excluded.
Such a representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review
could support invalidating the Texas Homosexual Conduct
Law. 8 The law imposed unique disabilities on a discrete and
insular minority (gay people) who have long been demonized in
the Texas political process. Before 1973, Texas made it a felony
for anyone to engage in consensual sodomy. 18 5 By 1973, it was
apparent to some legislators that sodomy, oral sex in particular, was widespread in the state, but almost no one would admit to such conduct, for religious or social shame reasons.
There were relatively few gay people in the state, and so their
interests could be entirely ignored. Under such circumstances,
it was a natural compromise to do what Texas did in 1973decriminalize consensual heterosexual sodomy and maintain
consensual homosexual sodomy as a crime. 88 This sent a politically acceptable set of signals, but at the expense of a minority.
The product of an unrepresentative process, the Homosexual
Conduct Law could remain in effect not just because it is hard
for any group to repeal legislation, but also because the private
and public discrimination that the law encouraged against
openly gay people kept most of them in the closet, and thereby
politically marginalized them even more effectively.
This is a dysfunctional process, and its dysfunctions bear
some similarity to those that disadvantaged African-Americans
in the twentieth century. Just as apartheid was a legal signal
that people of color were social outcasts, so the Homosexual
183. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see
Bixby, supra note 28. The famous Carolene Products footnote 4 was the basis
for the equally famous "representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review
defended in JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Ely also suggested the referee model for judicial review. Id. at 73-104.
184. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2003).
185. 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 112 (making it a felony to engage in nonprocreative "carnal copulation").
186. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399 § 21.06.
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Conduct Law was a legal signal that gay people were outlaws.
Both groups were unfairly treated as pariah groups, and the
laws key to their pariah status exemplify the kinds of cases
where a representation-reinforcing Court might intervene.
"[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority
87
must be imposed generally."1
The foregoing account is one way to justify Lawrence
against Justice Scalia's charge that the Court should have left
the matter to the Texas legislature. But the argument lends
more support to Justice O'Connor's proposition that the Texas
law be invalidated on equal protection grounds, than to Justice
Kennedy's proposition that all consensual sodomy laws violate
due process protections. So not only does Justice O'Connor's position best reflect the constraints of stare decisis, but it is also
most faithful to representation-reinforcement theories of judicial review.
There is another way of thinking about judicial review that
lends more support to Justice Kennedy's opinion. In addition to
local lock-ins and prejudice-based discriminations, a third problem with pluralist democracy is that its stakes can get too high.
This is a particular problem when groups hate or demonize one
another, the classic culture-clash scenario. In the modern regulatory state, an early impulse of a dominant social group that
hates a minority group is to deploy the apparatus of the state
against the minority. One brutal example of this scenario is the
Kulturkampf, where the state seeks to erase a minority or coerce it into conformity through a campaign of terror, criminal
prosecutions, and forfeitures for disobedience.' 88 Less brutal examples involve interference with the minority's institutions or
harassment of individuals in the minority.
It is dangerous for the state to take such decisive sides in
culture clashes. By brutalizing or even just harassing minorities, the state feeds their anger, which can be embittering for
187. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
188. The original Kulturkampf was Chancellor Bismarck's effort to domesticate the Roman Catholic Church in Imperial Germany. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J.
2411, 2414 (1997). At about the same time, the United States was involved in
a Kulturkampf against the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints.
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the minority, dangerous for the majority (because it feeds their
moral smugness), and destabilizing for the democracy. Angry
minorities will tend to go outside the political process to vent
their anger against the majority, or the state itself. Violence
becomes a stronger possibility. The nightmare result is the
Game of Chicken, where each group keeps raising the stakes of
their conflict, with disastrous results for both sides (and the
general public). 9 From a social point of view, this is a very bad
game for Americans to be engaged in. If played repeatedly, it
raises the stakes and the costs of culture clashes exponentially.
If the escalation is not stopped, the Game of Chicken can destroy the conditions for democracy itself.'90
C. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF TOLERANCE

Going beyond representation-reinforcement theory, one
might speculate that the Supreme Court might play a constructive role in managing culture clashes to minimize their threat
to pluralist democracy. To understand how this is a conservative political theory that would be attractive to Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, we need to expand our horizon beyond
Lawrence and Romer and examine other instances of vigorous
judicial activism that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor (and
Scalia) willingly joined.
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group,' a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that a Massachusetts law barring sexual orientation discrimination by public
accommodations could not constitutionally be applied to the
Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade. The parade organizers sought
to present a particular, generally traditionalist point of view,
and the presence of an openly lesbian, gay, and bisexual marching group would detract from that point of view. 192 Accordingly,
the Court held that the law, as applied, violated the Speech

189. In the classic Game of Chicken, two young males with more testosterone than brains drive hot rods on a collision course toward one another, at escalating speeds. The first to swerve is the "loser." If both swerve, they are both
"losers." If neither swerves, they are both "totaled."
190. Cf ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 26-37 (1991)

(noting that democracy is a self-enforcing equilibrium only so long as all
groups see themselves better off under democracy than they would be under a
state of nature).
191. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
192. See id. at 572-73.
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Clause of the First Amendment.9 In Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale,'4T a divided Court extended Hurley to invalidate the application of a similar antidiscrimination law to the Boy Scouts.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court found that the
Boy Scouts were an expressive association whose normative "no
promo homo" message would be undermined by the presence of
an openly gay man as an assistant scoutmaster.' In short, the
First Amendment protects the rights of private parades (Hurley) and associations (Dale) to express TFV attitudes through
excluding gays.
To understand the jurisprudence of Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, one must understand Dale and Hurley as well as
Lawrence and Romer.'96 A Court that decides Dale and Hurley
is not a Court that has swallowed the "homosexual agenda."
But a Court that decides Romer and Lawrence as well as Hurley and Dale is a Court that has accepted an activist role in
I now maintain that this is a producmanaging culture clashes.
197
tive role for the Court.
All four decisions can be justified by a theory drawn from a
193. See id. at 581.
194. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
195. The Boy Scouts' message did not become clear until their reply brief
was filed with the Supreme Court. There, the Scouts opined that they did not
want to "promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior" to
their charges, and that having an openly gay scoutmaster would send that
message. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640 (2000) (No. 99-699); see Brief for Petitioners at 21, id. (describing the Boy
Scouts' original message was that it wanted to be completely neutral, neither
"anti-gay" nor conveying "approval of homosexual conduct either"). Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion found the Scouts' message too unclear to merit
First Amendment protection. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 665-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were the only members of the Court
in the majority for all four cases. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer were in the majority of all but Dale. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas voted against rights for gay people in each of the four
cases.
197. I should note that I have reservations about the reasoning in Hurley,
and both the result and the reasoning in Dale. These decisions reflect a most
imperial First Amendment, but as precedents of the Court, they are of course
the law of the land. Moreover, context makes a big difference. If read only with
Hardwick as background, Hurley and (especially) Dale can easily be read to
reflect a Court that is simply hostile to gay people-allowing intolerant states
to put them in jail and deny them all manner of civil rights, and thwarting the
efforts of tolerant states to assure gay people access to public accommodations.
Once Lawrence and Romer replace Hardwick as the relevant background,
however, Hurley and (even) Dale can be read as signals that the Court will
protect both gay people and traditionalists where the Constitution requires.

2004]

JURISPRUDENCEOF TOLERANCE

1075

legal process reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's original
meaning. Recall that the original purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment were to guarantee the rule of law for all persons,
to recognize a libertarian presumption against state intrusion
into our privacy, and to militate against class or caste legislation. Rather than thinking about these purposes in the context
of gay people's emergence as an accepted identity group in
American politics, as I did above, consider how these purposes
help us think about the constitutional politics of culture
clashes.
These Fourteenth Amendment principles suggest a conservative judicial strategy for dealing with culture clashes when
they involve state action. Judicial review enforcing these principles is not only faithful to the Framers' design, but plays a
productive role in the political management of culture clashes.
Under what I call a jurisprudence of tolerance, the role of judicial review is threefold: (1) to lower the political stakes of culture clashes; (2) to assure each group an opportunity to flourish
and, indeed, to demonstrate that its normative program is a
good one; and (3) to channel group disputes through the state
rather than through private violence.
1. Lowering the Stakes of Identity Politics
Culture clashes threaten to raise the stakes of politics, allowing the (temporarily) dominant group not only to enshrine
its philosophy into public policy, but also to impose deep and
harmful costs on the minority. The Fourteenth Amendment is
fundamentally set against this. Its rule of law and anti-caste
purposes promise all groups that laws will be applied generally,
evenly, and fairly. Laws motivated by a desire to hurt a group
are inconsistent with these values and lack even a rational basis. Moreover, the libertarian principle in the Fourteenth
Amendment augurs against legislation that deprives a minority
of important freedoms without strong justification in the legitimate needs of the overall community.
A Supreme Court that firmly but evenhandedly enforces
these purposes can lower the stakes of culture-clash politics.
Some traditionalists despise gay people, and many traditionalists wish there were fewer openly gay people in the public culture, but the Court in Romer told them, "You cannot take away
these people's basic civil rights." In Lawrence, the Court told
them, "You cannot put these people in jail or treat them as presumptive outlaws." But the Dale Court told them, "And neither
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can gay people do bad things to you. Your youth group is a safe
place for you to express and inculcate your values, and it goes
without saying that your home, your church, your parochial
school, your other normative associations are all enclaves
where the state cannot impose politically correct or progay values on you." To LGBT people who do not like the result in Dale,
the Court has this to say, "You wouldn't like it if the state required your newspapers, churches, and bars to be completely
open to traditionalists. Give them their space-and then try to
persuade your local community that youth groups should not be
afraid of gay leaders."
This jurisprudence lowers the stakes of identity politics in
several ways. First, it takes away big weapons from the combatants. Each group is disabled from using the state to harm
people in the other group at a deep level. Second, it prevents
people in each group from feeling frustrated that they are prevented from getting out their message. Third, these cases press
each group toward arguments and rhetoric that emphasize the
positive (here is what we believe) rather than the negative
(those people are squalid). By lowering the stakes of politics,
the Court is creating spaces in which two conflicting groups can
coexist, and maybe learn to tolerate one another. If they never
learn to tolerate one another, the Court will not let them hurt
one another, especially through state action.
Consider a homely analogy, the family. Assume religious
parents who teach all their children that marriage is the only
proper forum for sexual expression. One of their six children is
a lesbian and explains her situation to the family. The parents
might counsel her and might even engage in subtle pressure for
her to consider dating boys.' 98 But it would be very bad parenting for them to expel the lesbian daughter from their house, to
lock her up in the basement until she "changes" her sexual orientation or agrees to undergo reparative therapy, or even to
stigmatize the daughter as a disappointment in contrast to the
straight kids.
The last point is the hardest to justify, but the most important. By stigmatizing the lesbian daughter, the parents are not
only hurting her, they are hurting the family's harmony and
198. For example, if the lesbian's sister marries a man, the parents might
not only put on a fabulous religious wedding, but also donate a generous wed-

ding gift to the bride and groom. The suggestion could be that the lesbian sister will not receive such a remunerative send-off if she marries or cohabits
with another woman.
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probably their straight children as well. The other children will
tend to take sides, and depending on the intensity of the parents' disapproval, they will harbor bitterness toward one another. Child A, who follows the parents' wishes, will become estranged from his sister. Child B, who values the lesbian sister,
may become estranged from Child A and embittered at his parents for subjecting the sister to their disapproval. Child C may
turn her rage on the lesbian sister. And so forth. Intolerance
turns this hypothetical family into a hornet's nest of resentments and hurt.
Most successful families operate upon a principle of tolerance that takes the edge off of normative disagreements within
the family. "She is my sister, and I love her, even though I do
not understand her lifestyle" is an attitude that ennobles both
persons and enables them to contribute to the welfare of the
family. Tolerance is an admirable trait. An instrumentalist justification for tolerance is that it enables different people to cooperate productively with one another in an institutional setting-not just the family, but also the state.
2. Protecting Normative Groups and Their Ability
to Proselytize
A corollary of the first idea (lowering the stakes of identity
politics) is to assure each clashing group an opportunity to persuade the community of its normative agenda. Here, the Fourteenth Amendment values complement established First
Amendment values.199 The libertarian norm of the Fourteenth
Amendment works with the anticensorship presumption of the
First Amendment to create a "super norm" that states cannot
limit identity speech and cannot cut off the flow of ideas, even if
contentious. When the state is forcing a particular viewpoint
through its censorship, the Constitution is especially vigilant,
even as to some state spending programs as well as criminal
laws. Here, the anti-caste norm of the Fourteenth Amendment
reinforces the First Amendment rule against viewpoint discrimination, even in cases where the state can engage in some
content regulation.
Last but not least important, the Fourteenth Amendment's
rule-of-law norm finds the happiest of parallels in the First

199. Of course, the First Amendment's Speech Clause was one of the first
provisions of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated into the Due Process Clause.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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Amendment, which has on the whole been a model of neutral
constitutionalism. The lesbian is happy that she can read feminist theory and can join with other women and gay men in associations that have meaning for her, all without state censorship and harassment. The Baptist is happy that she can read
biblical works and can join with other religious people to worship and share the Word, also without state meddling. Each
might be tempted to regulate the other: The lesbian finds the
Baptist's denunciation of homosexuality as "an abomination to
God" hate speech that sets a bad example for her children; the
Baptist finds the lesbian's open cohabitation with another
woman to be sinful conduct that sets a bad example for her
children. Yet each accepts that her own freedom requires her to
respect the freedom of her sister. One might say that the twentieth century produced a huge First Amendment logroll where
everyone is most delighted that he or she can speak out and associate freely and accepts the same freedoms for speech and association he or she does not like.
3. Channeling Group Disputes and Domesticating Culture
Clashes
The core rule-of-law role for the state is to maintain order
and to prevent the havoc characteristic in a state of nature.
Having an independent judiciary contributes to this conservative project by channeling group disputes into government
processes rather than into private ones (like feuds and other
institutions characteristic of the dreaded state of nature). For
channeling to work, each group in a normative contest must believe that judges will not be biased against its members and
will give it a fair shake.
Channeling works at the level of rhetoric as well as conduct. Activist (but not too activist) judicial review can help domesticate culture clashes. By requiring each group in a culture
clash to tone down its denigrating rhetoric, judicial review domesticates their conflict insofar as it occurs in the political
arena. The domestication of culture clashes is important in
maintaining the advantages of political pluralism-moderation,
stability, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Judicial review helps social groups avoid mutually destructive Games of
Chicken. This is a big boon for the modern regulatory state.
This triple role ofjudicial review-lowering stakes, protecting expression, and channeling-helps us understand why
Hardwick was such a bad decision. It raised the stakes of poli-
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tics because it reaffirmed the power of the state to brand homosexuals as criminals, and did so in an opinion that went out of
its way to disrespect gay people.200 The collateral consequences
of presumptive criminality were quite significant in some
states. Together, this was a legal regime designed to marginalize gay people socially and politically by keeping them out of
those states or confining them to the closet. Given the greater
tolerance they had come to expect from modern government in
Canada, the United States, and Europe, gay people were angered by Hardwick. Its transparently antigay motivation
threatened the neutrality of the Court in matters of sexuality,
gender, and the law.
Just as the jurisprudence of tolerance supports Lawrence,
so too does it lend support to both Hurley and Dale. A state that
tells a traditionalist association whom it can admit and what
message it sends is a state that is raising the stakes of politics.
Even (or especially) politically correct censorship generates anger, and the Court was right to erase the censorship. When the
state imposes a conformist agenda on people's core libertiesprivate sexual activities, associational freedoms, selfexpression, the practice of religion-it poses great risks of raising the stakes of the culture clash, of preventing one group
from having a fair chance to make its case to Americans, and of
driving some groups or some members to private violence.
A corollary of the jurisprudence of tolerance is that there
are strong limits to judicial activism. Indeed, the jurisprudence
of tolerance cautions against hasty or premature activism that
raises rather than lowers the stakes of politics. This was the
central problem with Roe. Although its protection of a woman's
right to choose an abortion was supported by both the libertarian and anti-caste norms of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
sweeping nature and the early timing of the Court's opinion
200. Justice White's most obvious sin was his obsessive, and unfounded,
focus on "homosexual sodomy," but more deeply insulting to LGBT people was
his dismissal of their heartfelt and deep normative claims as, "at best, facetious." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). That White's dismissal came at the end of a
historical discussion that was factually erroneous and analytically sloppy signaled not just that the Court was biased against gays, but that it was smug in
its confidence that it did not even have to explore gay people's constitutional
arguments and history with any degree of seriousness. "Of course we're ignorant of those people's history. Why should we waste our time?" This was a
deeply unprofessional message for the Court to be sending to a group that had
been persecuted by the state, but was demonstrating to America that its
members were productive citizens whose claims had to be taken seriously.
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struck many as inconsistent with the rule-of-law norm and the
orderly operation of the democratic process.2 °' In 1973, more
than a dozen states had just liberalized their nineteenthcentury abortion laws, and four of those states had completely
deregulated abortion.0 2 Most other states were considering
abortion law reform, and there is every reason to believe that a
large majority of states would have accomplished reform in the
1970s-on their own and without any direct pressure from the
Supreme Court.0 3
It is not clear that Texas would have modernized its law,
which was the law reviewed in Roe. Adopted in the nineteenth
century (before women had the right to vote), the Texas law
was the most sweeping in the country, making abortion a crime
unless necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman. Justice Blackmun's initial draft opinion would have invalidated
the law on vagueness grounds; it gave neither doctors nor patients adequate guidance as to when they could perform the
procedure.20 ' Although his colleagues insisted that Justice
Blackmun draft a more substantive opinion, my theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests that the initial draft was the
better one, for it would have swept away the most obsolescent
laws without foreclosing state reregulation that could then
have been reviewed upon a more complete record. In short, it
would not have raised the stakes of abortion politics and in fact
would have returned that politics to state legislatures, which
would have reached a series of compromises and accommodations.
By taking most abortion-related policy issues away from
the political process and disrespecting the pro-life position, the
Court raised the stakes (the intensity) of pro-life politics even
more than Hardwick would do in the next decade. Mark this

201. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-29
(1975); BORK, supra note 98, at 111-16.

202.

Mary C. Segers & Timothy A. Byrnes, Introduction to ABORTION

POLITICS IN AMERICAN STATES 1, 2-4 (Mary C. Segers & Timothy A. Byrnes
eds., 1995).
203. See generally GARROW, supra note 32, at 335-88 (describing state developments in abortion law reform before Roe).
204. See Drafts and Memorandum regarding Roe v. Wade (on file at the Library of Congress, Madison Building, Papers of William 0. Douglas, Container
1590) (including Justice Douglas's notes on the first Roe conference, as well as
Justice Blackmun's original draft vagueness opinion and Justice White's
strong dissent, and memos from the other majority Justices urging Blackmun
to go beyond the vagueness rationale).
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irony. Richard Nixon appointed the Burger Court Justices as
strict constructionists who would avoid the activism of the
Warren Court. Falling athwart both Scylla (Roe) and Charybdis
(Hardwick), the Burger Court was one of the politically clumsiest Courts in our nation's history. Led by Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy, the Rehnquist Court has been politically much
more adept, just as it has been even more activist. Casey undid
some of the pluralism damage of Roe-affirming a substantial
leeway for the states to regulate abortions even as a majority
symbolically reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe. Lawrence
and Romer undid most of the pluralism damage of Hardwickbut without making the mistake of getting too far ahead of the
country. These Justices have charted a successful course, so
far, between Scylla and Charybdis.
Shoals lurk in murky waters ahead, however. The judiciary
ought not, and really cannot for an extended period of time,
disrupt a nationwide normative equilibrium on important political issues. Thus, if almost all Americans despise and fear
"homosexuals," as they did in the 1950s, the courts cannot
change that hatred and fear and cannot impose a regime of
equal treatment of the despised minority, though they can slow
down any deployment of state apparatus to destroy the minority. The country's ho-hum reaction to the demise of sodomy
laws supports the universal surmise that these old antigay attitudes have changed, but the alarm in most of the country to the
possibility of same-sex marriage suggests that public attitudes
have not completely reversed themselves.
The current political equilibrium in the United States is
that homosexuality is not a malignant condition and is, in fact,
a tolerable variation. But it is a tolerable variation from the
norm of heterosexuality, which for most Americans is clearly
the best sexual orientation and one the state should favor.
These are not attitudes that the judiciary can change, and judicial challenges to these attitudes would be futile, perhaps even
counterproductive. If most Americans believe that gay people
are harmless misfits but not qualified for the elevated status of
civil marriage, the judiciary not only cannot, but ought not, impose same-sex marriage on the hesitant body politic. To do so
would inflame the culture clash and raise the stakes of politics.
V. REGIME SHIFTS AND SLIPPERY SLOPES:
THE END OF MORALS REGULATION?
Every regime shift threatens a slippery slope. Once the
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Court calls a prior normative understanding into constitutional
question, once-settled issues will be open for rethinking and relitigation. This includes not just obvious issues, but also collateral issues, because lawyers have every incentive to press any
envelope that the Court might reopen. So Brown not only
opened up two generations of litigation over racial segregation
in public schools, but also triggered constitutional challenges to
racial segregation of other state and municipal facilities and
services, to state laws barring or criminalizing different-race
sexual relations and marriage, to state and federal race-based
remedial policies such as affirmative action in state employment and contracting, and so forth. And Brown inspired other
groups to bring their own challenges to systematic state discrimination against them-not just women, but also nonmarital children and gay people in the 1960s and 1970s, elderly
folks and people in poverty in the 1970s and 1980s, people with
disabilities in the 1980s and 1990s, and others sure to come.
This phenomenon inspired Justice Scalia's charge that
Lawrence would mean the end of all laws regulating public
morals-or at least those that clash with the mores of five Justices. The following morals laws are now dead, Scalia opined:
laws criminalizing fornication, adultery, incest, obscenity, bestiality, prostitution, and masturbation(!)."'6 This is an old argument. In the United Kingdom a generation ago, Lord Patrick
Devlin assailed the Wolfenden Report's recommendation that
consensual sodomy be decriminalized with the argument that
one of the chief ends of government is to regulate social morality.206 His Lordship worried that if consensual sodomy were deregulated, there would be no neutral reason not to decriminalize other reprehensible behaviors such as adultery, bestiality,
incest, cockfighting, and fornication. °7
Is Lawrence the end of morals legislation in the United
States? Don't believe it. England did not fall down Lord Devlin's slippery slope after it decriminalized consensual sodomy in

205. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are
"sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral
choices"); id. at 2495 (same charge as to "laws against fornication, bigamy,
adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity"); id. at 2496 (same charge as to laws
against adultery, fornication, adult incest, and same-sex marriage).
206.
207.

PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1968).
See id. at 1-25.
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1967,208 and there is no reason the United States will fall down
Scalia's slipperier slope. Lawrence does, however, clarify the
constitutional status of morals laws, and the academic debate
will clarify their status even more. Consider three different, but
complementary, ways of thinking about the Devlin-Scalia criticism.
One response to this criticism is libertarian. A distinguished body of moral philosophy maintains that the state cannot restrict important liberties of its citizens just because other
citizens disapprove of their exercise. The state has no moral or
political authority to restrict such important liberties, except
when their exercise tangibly harms third parties.2 9 Lawrence

might be read to establish such a strong libertarian baseline for
state regulation of sexual activities.2 ' 0 That is a principle that
links Lawrence comfortably with Griswold, Eisenstadt, and
Roe. In her commentary on Lawrence, Professor Suzanne Goldberg maintains that Supreme Court majorities in the last 100
years have almost never sustained state regulation of morality
without some credible evidence that assertedly immoral conduct harmed third parties.'
Indeed, Professor Goldberg's analysis of Lawrence and previous cases suggests that the Devlin-Scalia criticism is not so
much wrong as it is obsolete-and obsolete before Lord Devlin

208. Sexual Offences Act 1967, c. 60 (Eng. & Wales).
209. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in PREFACES TO LIBERTY
241 (Bernard Wishy ed., Beacon Press 1959) (1859) (presenting the classic
statement of libertarian philosophy); JEREMY BENTHAM, Paederasty (pts. 1 &
2), reprinted in 3 J. HOMOSEXUALTY 383 (Louis Crompton ed., 1978) and 4 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 91 (Louis Crompton ed., 1978) (1785) (arguing against state
regulation of consensual sodomy because it limits the pleasure available to
sodomites without preventing harm to third parties); see also H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (responding to Lord Devlin with a mild
version of Mill's libertarian philosophy); POSNER, supra note 53 (taking a
pragmatic libertarian approach to America's many sex laws).
210, Some of the language of Justice Kennedy's opinion has a whiff of Mill.
E.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (contrasting sodomy between consenting
adults in the home with other conduct having third-party effects-rape, sex
with minors (who cannot consent), public sexual conduct (that would harm
captive audiences)). Randy Barnett reads Lawrence to encode Mill's libertarian
philosophy within the Due Process Clause, a reading disputed by Dale Carpenter. Compare Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's LibertarianRevolution:
Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2002-2003 21, 33-37,
39 (James L. Swanson ed., 2003), with Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1148-70 (2004).
211. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-BasedJustificationsfor Lawmaking:
Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1261-83 (2004).
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rendered it. The Supreme Court's reasoning in moralsregulation cases closely tracks Max Weber's famous theory
about what distinguishes a modern society from a premodern
one.21 What marks the transition from premodern to modern
law and society is a movement from enforcement of status distinctions through regulation of status-expressing conduct toward instrumentalist regulation of conduct because of its consequences for other people or the public.
For example, one staple of premodern thinking is that it is
very important to reaffirm the different statuses of being male
and being female by adopting legal regulations of nonconforming dress and conduct. So traditionalist societies actually impose legal penalties on women and men who transgress sometimes quite complicated dress rules. Modern society can have
morals legislation just as premodern society can, but it has to
be justified along socially instrumental lines. For example,
American cities and states have traditionally made it a crime to
cross-dress.1 Although originally adopted as expressions of a
biblical or natural law philosophy, these laws were rejustified
and enforced in the twentieth century as a means of policing
deviant behavior by gay men and, especially, lesbians. That instrumentalist justification collapsed after Stonewall, and one
jurisdiction after another repealed its cross-dressing laws or
saw them invalidated by courts."'
Although cross-dressing laws have died in modern America, most other morals regulations have survived because they
have been modernized.2 15 Under premodern premises, a father's
sexual assault on his daughter is wrongful because it violates

212. See 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 998-1002 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1968). For applications of Weber's ideas, see ROSEMARY PRINGLE,
SECRETARIES TALK 85-89 (Verso 1989) (1988); ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN
AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
213. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 338-41. Cross-dressing
regulations are classic premodern legal forms. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 22:5
(stating that cross-dressing is "abhorrent to the Lord").
214. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 27-29, 111, 338-41 (detail-

ing the rise and fall of cross-dressing laws).
215. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of
Antigay Discourse and the ChannelingEffect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1327 (2000) (showing the modernization and sedimentation of justifications for antigay status rules); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating
as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (arguing that traditional status categories can survive and even prosper because their justifications are modernized).
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the natural law (or God's law) rule of no sex outside of marriage. In the modern era, this conduct is even more deeply immoral, not because it is contrary to natural law, but rather because it has catastrophic effects on a particularly vulnerable
third party. Under premodern premises, a husband's adultery
is wrongful because it is a betrayal of the natural law (God's)
institution of marriage. In the modern era, this justification has
taken a back seat to the notion that adultery violates the promise the husband made to remain faithful to his wedded wife.
Notwithstanding this modernized justification, however, adultery is only a crime in twenty-five states, and usually a misdemeanor in those jurisdictions. 16
So the list of morals laws that would fall under a strongly
libertarian reading of Lawrence is shorter than Justice Scalia
says. Even bestiality laws might be sustained under a libertarian philosophy. Under my updated Weberian theory, the Court
would eschew or downplay a rationale emphasizing how disgusting sex with animals is to the reasonable American and
would emphasize some instrumental rationale. Some studies
suggest that bestiality is linked to sexual assault on children
and, if believed, that could be a respectable modern rationale.2 7
My point is not that bestiality laws should be upheld (I really
don't care). Rather, it is that such laws can be and would be defended on libertarian grounds that would be admissible even
under Justice Scalia's broad reading of the Lawrence majority.
A second way to respond to Justice Scalia is substantive.
The state can have morals legislation, but it cannot condemn or
criminalize conduct that is deeply moral to many productive
Americans. More than forty years ago, in a pre-Griswold
contraception case, Yale Professor Fowler Harper suggested to
the Supreme Court that sexual pleasure is an important end in
itself, and frustration of one's preferred sexual outlet, by the
216. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 62, at 100 & n.i (listing state laws as
of 2003).
217. For studies providing a tentative empirical link between sexual abuse
of animals and sexual assault generally, see William M. Fleming et al., Characteristicsof Juvenile Offenders Admitting to Sexual Activity with Nonhuman
Animals, 10 SOC'Y & ANIMALS 31, 36-37 (2002); Robert K. Ressler et al., Murderers Who Rape and Mutilate, 1 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 273, 277-78
(1986). See also Carol J. Adams, Bestiality: The Unmentioned Abuse, THE
ANIMALS' AGENDA Nov./Dec. 1995, at 29 (finding the zoophile's view of the
world is similar to that of the rapist and child abuser); Carol J. Adams, Bringing Peace Home: A Feminist PhilosophicalPerspective on the Abuse of Women,
Children, and Pet Animals, HYPATIA Spring 1994, at 63 (noting that child
abusers may abuse animals to enhance the abuse of child victims).
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state or otherwise, is psychologically harmful to the individual
as well as the family. 18 "'[While in the lower animals sexual
pleasure is primarily a means to an end, in human beings it is
not only a means to an end but also a very important end in itself,"' and suppressing sexual pleasure through a regimen of
continence "'is harmful to the personality'" and even risks emotional turmoil that gives rise to "'pathological expression.' 219
A fundamental feature of the LGBT politics of recognition
is the notion that homosexual intimacy is a human good, meaningful to gay people for the same reasons that penile-vaginal
(and other forms of) intercourse are meaningful to straight
people. 20 I think this proposition is a defensible and indeed correct corollary to Professor Harper's advice a generation earlier.
But Lawrence does not, and should not be read to, embrace this
excellent moral point. Justice Kennedy's opinion offers Lawrence and Garner "respect for their private lives" 22' and affirms
their freedom to enter into a "personal bond" that entails sexual intercourse. 22 But that is as far as he goes. The theme of
his opinion is tolerance of private homosexual intimacy and not
equivalence of such intimacy with the intimacies of23 marriage or
even heterosexual intimacies outside of marriage.2
Given the current normative equilibrium in the United
States, Justice Kennedy made the right call, one that gay people can understand and accept. Middle America can accept that
homosexuality is a tolerable variation from the "norm," namely
heterosexuality. To affirm that norm and render it a constitutional floor lowers the stakes of politics for gay people, who can
no longer be jailed for their private activities or treated as open
218. See Brief for Appellants at 29-31, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)
(1960 Term, No. 60) (harm of sexual abstinence to the individual); id. at 31-33
(harm to family life).
219. Id. at 29-30 (quoting Karl Menninger, PsychiatricAspects of Contraception, 7 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 36 (1943)).

220. See CARLOS BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS 4 (2003) (noting that
the gay rights movement is increasingly seeking societal recognition and support, and not merely to be left alone); Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation,
Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 331-36
(1996) (drawing on this idea as a response to Lord Devlin); see also Sandel, supra note 163, at 534-38 (discussing the substantive claim that homosexual intimacy, like heterosexual intimacy, is a good).
221. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
222. Id. at 2478.
223. See id. at 2484 ("The right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives [Lawrence and Garner] the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention by the government.").
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outlaws by the state. To affirm that norm, without seeking to
elevate homosexuality to the same normative level as heterosexuality, is a signal to traditionalists that their core values
and lifestyles should not be threatened. 224 The further, and implicit, message of Justice Kennedy's opinion is that it is up to
LGBT people and their normative politics of recognition to
move public opinion from the tolerable variation norm to the
norm that homosexuality is a benign variation (and there is no
single norm for sexual orientation). 2 25
A third way to respond to Justice Scalia is to focus on social
consensus. Courts might evaluate statutes that limit people's
freedom to engage in conduct that they enjoy more leniently if
it appears that most Americans still consider the regulated
conduct morally harmful. Conversely, the same kind of statutes
would fall if it appears that Americans no longer consider the
regulated conduct morally harmful. So the Justices may have
been influenced by objective indications as to how successful
the LGBT rights movement had been in persuading neutral observers that homosexual sodomy was not such terrible conduct
that it ought to be a crime.226 As Justice Kennedy emphasized,
all but thirteen states had repealed their consensual sodomy
laws by 2003, and courts abroad and even in our nation's most
traditionalist jurisdictions had found consensual sodomy to be a
constitutionally protected liberty.227
Indeed, such a finger-to-gauge-the-winds-of-change approach suggests a way to reconcile Hardwick and Lawrence. In
1986, when Hardwick was handed down, the political signals

224. The strategy of the dissenting opinion was to announce that, in fact,
the majority was raising the stakes of politics for traditionalists: Today the
"homosexuals" get out of jail; tomorrow they will be legally wed. Id. at 2498
(Scalia, J., dissenting). This charge was wrong as a matter of fact, and it was
unproductive as a matter of the Court's institutional legitimacy. That the
Chief Justice of the United States joined such a provocative dissent is unfortunate. (Contrast Justice Thomas's sober and responsible dissent. Id. at 2498
(Thomas, J., dissenting).)
225. See id. at 2484 ("[Tlimes can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to express.").
226. In Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has relied on state and even
foreign statutory trends toward mercy, as a strong reason to reevaluate the
application of the death penalty to certain classes of defendants. See Atkins v.
Virginia, 122 S. Ct, 2242, 2248-50 (2002) (considering the application of the
death penalty to mentally disabled defendants); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 826-31 (1988) (juveniles).
227. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-83 (citing cases).
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were much more mixed. Twenty-four states still had consensual
sodomy laws, as did the District of Columbia.22 8 Indeed, in 1981
the District had repealed its consensual sodomy law as part of a
modernization of its sex crime laws-but the reform had been
assailed by the Reverend Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority and by
229
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Washington, James Hickey.
Arguing that the reform law would promote immoral homosexuality, Falwell and Hickey stampeded the U.S. House of
Representatives
to veto the District's law by a bipartisan 281S230
119 vote. Only one state (Wisconsin) deregulated consensual
sodomy in the decade after that House action.231 Thus, the

Hardwick Court might have reasonably believed that there was
a lot of support for consensual sodomy laws in the 1980s-a belief that would not have been reasonable in 2003.
So social movements reemerge as central, to the extent
that they actually change social norms in the country. Laws
against fornication were dead letters before Lawrence. In the
wake of the sexual revolution of the 1960s, most Americans are
sodomites and fornicators as well (many are both). Like consensual sodomy laws, laws against fornication have dried up at the
state level and are almost never enforced against consenting
adults in the privacy of the home. If they were not already unconstitutional under Eisenstadt, they surely are after Lawrence.
The foregoing three ways of responding to the DevlinScalia position not only undermine the notion that Lawrence is
the constitutional death of all morals regulations, but also suggest how those regulations should be evaluated. Recall the
three principles at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment that
inform the jurisprudence of tolerance: (1) the rule of law, with
particular attention to the coherence of a policy or law with

228. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472.
229. See 127 CONG. REC. 22,762-63 (statement of Rep. Philip M. Crane)

(reading letter from Archbishop Hickey expressing that the D.C. legislation
"weakened" the "fabric of society"); id. at 22,768 (statement of Rep. McKinney)

(quoting a Washington Post editorial citing Reverend Jerry Falwell as calling

the D.C. act "perverted").
230.

Id. at 22,770, 22,778-79 (Oct. 1, 1981) (roll call vote on House Resolu-

tion 208). Among those voting for the Resolution were Representatives Richard Cheney of Wyoming, Geraldine Ferraro of New York, Richard Gephardt of
Missouri, Newt Gingrich of Georgia, Albert Gore of Tennessee, and Steve

Gunderson of Wisconsin. Id.
231. 1983 Wis. Laws 17 § 5.
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other policies or laws today (and not just the distant past); (2)
the libertarian presumption and the harm principle; and (3) the
rule against class legislation, with particular attention to
whether a social movement has successfully called into question a traditional moral rule.
These constitutional principles and responses to DevlinScalia can be synthesized into doctrinal variables-features of
a liberty-infringing policy that render it more or less constitutionally vulnerable under the Fourteenth Amendment. So a
morals law that prohibits conduct that (1) is no longer widely
criminalized and (2) does not seem to impose harm on third
parties but (3) is important to a coherent and well-organized
social group, is most constitutionally objectionable. For the reasons suggested above, fornication easily fits within this unregulable core: Most states have decriminalized it, there is virtually
no evidence of third-party harms, and a whole generation (the
baby boomers) considers the right to fornicate important to
their lives, or formative experiences in their youths. Masturbation is an even easier call from Scalia's list, as it is not a crime
anywhere in the United States, and it does not harm anyone.232
Conversely, laws criminalizing conduct that (1) is still a
crime in a large majority of states, (2) demonstrably harms
third parties or the community, and (3) has not become the focus of a social movement, are easy calls in the other directionthe state has substantial freedom to criminalize or regulate.
Most of the items on Scalia's list fall within this category of
currently permissible state regulation: adultery, which violates
a promise of fidelity and often imposes reliance and other costs
on the innocent spouse; public prostitution, which remains universally regulated and is associated with nuisances of various
sorts; child pornography, which is universally regulated and
has properly been upheld on the ground that participation in it
harms children; and incest involving minors, which is universally regulated and has not become the focus of a social movement. By the way, since 1900, most morals regulations have
been laws protecting children against a variety of sexual
knowledges and experiences. One may debate the wisdom of
232. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Law, Self-Pollution, and the Management of
Social Anxiety, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 221, 261-89 (2001) (describing the

cultural and legal history of masturbation regulation).
233. See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383 (1988)
(discussing a Virginia law criminalizing the commercial display of sexually
explicit materials in a manner whereby juveniles could peruse or examine

1090

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1021

this wide array of laws, and many of them have proven vulnerable under the First Amendment,23 4 but neither Lawrence nor
the jurisprudence of tolerance poses any constitutional threat
to them.
The hardest calls are some of the adult incest cases, including sex between first cousins and siblings by affinity (marriage)
rather than blood. Although adult incest between siblings is
criminal almost everywhere, many states do not include siblings by affinity, and most do not make it a crime for first cousins to have sex.236 If the reported cases are any guide, these
statutes are almost never enforced in cases involving consensual intercourse. The harm of adult incest seems speculative
but plausible: If close relatives (cousins) or people raised together (siblings by affinity) could engage in sex once they became adults, the family as a sexually "safe" place would be undermined. On the other hand, there are none of the collateral
consequences for adult incestophiles that Lawrence found troubling for homosexual sodomy laws. Additionally, no social
movement has formed to persuade America that adult incest is
okay. In large part because the social and normative stakes of
adult incest among cousins or siblings by affinity are so low,
Lawrence and its (or my) jurisprudence of tolerance do not at
this time require that even these statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
VI. LAWRENCE AND HOMO EQUALITY
Justice Scalia's slipperiest slope-and his biggest fear-is
that Lawrence now requires the Court, and the nation, to swallow the entire "homosexual agenda." 23 6 That agenda includes
service of openly gay or bisexual Americans in the armed forces
them).
234. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
827 (2000) (holding a statute requiring that television channels "primarily
dedicated to sexually oriented programming" be fully scrambled or blocked
during the day, when children could likely view them, as unnecessarily restrictive content-based speech regulation inviolation of the First Amendment).
235. See Martha Mahoney, A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The Example of Incest Regulation, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 21, 26-29 (1993); Brett H.
McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 2004)
(post-Lawrence analysis); Christine McNiece Metteer, Some "Incest"Is Harmless Incest, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 262 (2000) (arguing that laws denying
the right to marry to adults related by affinity may be constitutionally suspect).
236. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2496-97 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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and state recognition of same-sex marriage. I think that the
LGBT rights movement will someday persuade most Americans
that these gay-friendly reforms represent good, and not just
tolerable, public policy. But the Supreme Court in Lawrence did
not create a constitutional regime that goes this far. With due
respect to Justice Scalia's excellent powers of analysis, he is being more provocative than persuasive in asserting that Lawrence logically or inferentially requires open gays in the military and same-sex marriage.
I would be the first to say that the case for same-sex marriage is a normatively compelling one, as excluding same-sex
couples is a hard-to-justify discrimination. But the case for
same-sex marriage is not one that the jurisprudence of tolerance will now impose on all the states as a constitutional matter. Even if Massachusetts starts issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples in May 2004, the other forty-nine states and
the District of Columbia still limit marriage to one man and
one woman. Thirty-eight states have statutes or constitutional
amendments barring recognition in those states of same-sex
marriages validly entered elsewhere. 39 Most Americans would
be disturbed by recognition of same-sex marriages in their
states, and for many Americans the limitation of marriage to
people of different sexes is at the core of their religious identi-

237. See id.
238. See CHESHIRE CALHOUN, FEMINISM, THE FAMILY, AND THE POLITICS
OF THE CLOSET: LESBIAN AND GAY DISPLACEMENT 107-15 (2000); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 87-122 (1996); MORRIS B.
KAPLAN, SEXUAL JUSTICE: DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND THE POLITICS OF

DESIRE 207-38 (1997); Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundationsfor a Discourse on
Same-Sex Marriage:Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1872,
1930-42 (1997); Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation:TransgenderedPeople
and Same-Sex Marriage,8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 257-65 (1998).
239. States with same-sex marriage nonrecognition statutes, as of January
2004, are (with the dates of enactment): Alabama (1998), Alaska (1996), Arizona (1996), Arkansas (1997), California (2000), Colorado (2000), Delaware
(1996), Florida (1997), Georgia (1996), Hawaii (1998), Idaho (1996), Illinois
(1996), Indiana (1997), Iowa (1998), Kansas (1996), Kentucky (1998), Louisiana (1999), Maine (1997), Michigan (1996), Minnesota (1997), Mississippi
(1997), Missouri (1996), Montana (1997), Nebraska (2000), Nevada (2002),
North Carolina (1996), North Dakota (1997), Ohio (2004), Oklahoma (1996),
Pennsylvania (1996), South Carolina (1996), South Dakota (1996), Tennessee
(1996), Texas (1973), Utah (1995), Virginia (1997), Washington (1998), and
West Virginia (2000). National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Specific AntiSame-Sex Marriage Laws in the U.S., at http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/
marriagemap.pdf (Jan. 2004). Most of these states also have definition of marriage statutes, usually adopted in the same legislation.
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Roe was a more compelling case for constitutional intervention on the part of the Supreme Court. My critique that Roe
raised rather than lowered the stakes of politics would apply
with even greater force to a Supreme Court decision requiring
same-sex marriage in 2004.
Does Lawrence then have no implications for LGBT equality rights? Return one final time to the three goals of the Fourteenth Amendment, rule of law (coherence), the libertarian presumption, and the anti-caste principle. These three goals can be
applied to various antigay discriminations through the lens of
tolerance now required by Lawrence. A constitutional right to
same-sex marriage is supported by the anti-caste principle, for
lesbian and gay couples will not be fully equal citizens until
they have the same choices for state recognition of their relationships that straight couples have. But the state's limitation
of marriage to different-sex couples does not much implicate
the liberty principle. The coherence principle cuts strongly
against same-sex marriage at this time: Not only have the
states traditionally not recognized same-sex unions as marriage, but no state does today, and there are few on the horizon.
So the case for same-sex marriage as a constitutional matter is powerfully debatable. Under such circumstances, the
politics of tolerance strongly counsels that the Supreme Court
do nothing for the time being. Either rejecting or endorsing the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bars would immediately
raise the stakes of national politics. The reason is that the issue
of same-sex marriage not only remains divisive, but divides in
ways that cut to the core of people's identities.
Under these circumstances, the Court's best strategy is to
leave the matter to the states, the famous laboratories of experimentation. Indeed, this is the strategy the Court took, with
241
success, in the right-to-die case, Washington v. Glucksberg.
Although the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court rejected any
constitutional right to die, five Justices took the position that
the matter was not ripe for complete resolution and pronounced
themselves open to future claims.242 Meanwhile, the states are
240. DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTI-GAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 60-91 (1997).

241.

521 U.S. 702, 735-36 (1997).

242.

Five Justices were open to a "constitutionally cognizable interest in

controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death," but felt that it
was premature to decide one way or another in 1997. Id. at 736-38 (O'Connor,
J.); see id. at 738-52 (Stevens, J.), 752-89 (Souter, J.), 789 (Ginsburg, J.), 789-
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free to recognize a right to die, and the experience from those
states (and from abroad) will provide valuable information for
other states and for the courts in future cases.
Like the right-to-die issue, same-sex marriage is an issue
that would benefit from state experimentation. A great thing
about federalism is that some states are open to gay people's
politics of full recognition: Homosexuality is not just a tolerable
variation, but is benign in the same way that race is-it ought
to make no difference in the state's treatment of a person.
Same-sex marriage has been the testing ground for this proposition. Prompted by a state supreme court decision, Vermont's
legislature debated this issue in 2000 and revealed its population to be open to recognition of lesbian and gay unions.243 In
2003, California extended its domestic partnership law to provide almost all the benefits and obligations of marriage to
same-sex couples. 244 These states were providing something

close to full and equal citizenship for lesbian and gay families,
and they did so through the democratic process. Their experience will be instructive for other states considering the next
step, one that Massachusetts is prepared to take in May 2004.
So the jurisprudence of tolerance does not give the nation
same-sex marriage, but it does provide strong arguments
against other antigay state discriminations. Consider a few:
1. Criminal Sentencing Discrimination.Kansas's criminal
code makes it a very serious crime for anyone to have oral or
anal sex with a minor who is 14-16 years old;24 punishment for
a first offense is 55-61 months in prison, with a range of 89100 months for a second offense and 206-228 months for a
third offense.246 The state has a Romeo and Juliet exception to
92 (Breyer, J.).
243. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 91 (responding to Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY
PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 43-82 (2002) (de-

tailing the Baker litigation and the legislative debates over the civil unions
law).
244. California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003,
ch. 421, 2003 Cal. Stats. 2586. Finding that same-sex couples form 'lasting,
committed, and caring relationships," id. § 1(b), the California Legislature extended almost all the rights, benefits, duties, and obligations of married
spouses to registered domestic partners, id. § 4(a). There is a long transition
period, so that current domestic partners can end their relationships if they do
not welcome the new duties and obligations; the 2003 law goes into effect on
January 1, 2005. Id. § 14.
245. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505(a)(2) (1995).
246. Id. § 21-3505(c) (severity level 3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4704 (Supp.
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this high level of punishment if the defendant is less than 19
years old, the age difference between the defendant and the
partner is less than four years, the defendant and the partner
are the only parties involved, and the teenagers are of the "opposite sex."247 There is no Romeo and Mercutio exception.
Under the Romeo and Juliet exception, punishment for a
first or second offense is presumptively probation; punishment
248'
for a third offense is no more than fifteen months in prison.
Eighteen-year-old Matthew Limon performed oral sex on a fifteen-year-old male partner in a residential school for developmentally disabled youth. 249 The state stipulated that the oral
sex was consensual but refused Limon the benefit of the Romeo
and 250Juliet penalties because the partners were of the same
Limon was sentenced to 206 months (over seventeen
sex.
years) in prison, followed by 60 months (five years) of postrelease supervision. 251' A day after Lawrence, the Supreme
Court vacated the Kansas appellate judgments upholding this
disparity and remanded the case for reconsiderasentencing
t.252
tion.
Although the Kansas Court of Appeals has reaffirmed this
discrimination,2 Lawrence and its associated jurisprudence require that the sentencing disparity be overturned. The Romeo
and Juliet rule represents a mercy exception to the steep sentences otherwise required for sex with minors. To limit the rule
to heterosexual sodomy is a core violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Like Kansas, a lot of states exempt teenagerteenager sex from their sex-with-minors laws. Few states, however, limit their exemptions to straights only. 54 So this is a
novel and still-rare discrimination against gay people. The liberty consequences of the discrimination are significantly worse
than those suffered by Messrs. Lawrence and Garner: They
were in jail for a day; Limon will remain in prison for seventeen
years. This is a steep price to pay for being gay. It is at least as

2002).
247.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522 (Supp. 2002).

248. Id. § 21-3522(2) (severity level 9); id. § 21-4704.
249.

State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 232 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).

250.

See id. at 233.

251.
252.

Id. at 232.
Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003).

253. Limon, 83 P.3d at 232.
254. One of the few laws limiting this kind of exemption to teenagers of different sexes is TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(b)(1) (Vernon 2003).
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deep an affront to gay people's equal citizenship as the Texas
Homosexual Sodomy Law was.
Thus, much more than same-sex marriage bars and somewhat more than homosexual sodomy laws, Romeo and Juliet
exceptions are strongly inconsistent with the principles and
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, once that amendment's protections are viewed as applying fully to LGBT people.
Judicial invalidation is warranted, and the jurisprudence of
tolerance strongly suggests that this would be a productive and
parsimonious use of the Court's political capital. These exceptions are relatively novel, and it is hard to imagine that even a
fundamentalist Christian would find his identity implicated in
maintaining this discrimination to the same extent that his
identity is implicated in maintaining the same-sex marriage
bar. The Court would not be raising the stakes of politics in the
least by striking down the discrimination in Limon, and it
would confirm the message of Lawrence in the context of teen
sexuality.
2. Antigay Presumptions in Child Custody Cases. After she
came out of the closet as an open lesbian, R.W. divorced her
husband, D.W.W., in 1996. The divorce was acrimonious. The
husband won custody of the couple's two minor children, and
the Alabama trial judge restricted the mother's visitation to
every other weekend and to the maternal grandparents' home
under their supervision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed
this humiliating order in Ex parte D.W.W. 255 One justification
for the custody order was the trial judge's finding that R.W.
was a bad mother. She and her partner were "active in the homosexual community," went to gay bars and a "homosexual
church," and "openly display affection in the children's presence." 256 The judge also found that after R.W. commenced cohabitation with her female partner, the children "began using
inappropriate and vulgar language and required psychiatric
counseling." 25 The daughter started to lie and manipulate others.25 8 Chief Justice Moore reasoned further:
Even without this evidence that the children have been adversely affected by their mother's relationship, the trial court would have been

justified in restricting R.W.'s visitation, in order to limit the children's
exposure to their mother's lesbian lifestyle.... Restrictions such as
255.

717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998).

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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those at issue here are common tools used to shield a child from the
harmful effects of a parent's illicit sexual relationships-heterosexual
or homosexual. Moreover, the conduct inherent in lesbianism is illegal
in Alabama. R.W., therefore, is continually engaging in conduct that
violates the criminal law of this state. Exposing the children to such a
lifestyle, one that is illegal under the laws of this state and immoral
29
in the eyes of most of its citizens, could greatly traumatize them.

Clearly, the reasoning and, probably, the judgment in
D.W.W. cannot survive Lawrence. The invocation of the Alabama sodomy law to punish the lesbian mother is the kind of
collateral effect that both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
found troubling in Lawrence.26 ° One effect of Lawrence will be to
press state judges away from sweeping antigay rhetoric such as
that in D.W. W., but many judges will nonetheless discriminate
against lesbian parents. Post-Lawrence, their justification will
have to rest upon findings that the lesbian parent is a bad
mother. In D.W.W., however, there was strong evidence that
the lesbian was a pretty good mother, and a much better parent
than the straight father. Dissenting justices in D.W.W. noted
the "serious alcohol abuse and violence" of the father. 61 Among
other escapades, the father totaled his car while driving drunk
with his daughter in the car unrestrained by a safety belt, was
charged on several occasions with domestic abuse, once closed
his infant son in a clothes dryer, threatened to kill R.W. and
the children, and was in financial default for some obligations
toward his children. 62 The dissenting justices also charged that
the majority ignored evidence that the children had excelled in
school over the year and a half they were in their mother's custody, and that the mother's partner, a child guidance counselor,
had spent many hours working with the daughter to improve
her skills and learning abilities.263
Denying a lesbian mother custody over or, especially, visitation with her own children because of her sexual orientation
is another core violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To
comply faithfully with that amendment, trial judges must focus
on the best interests of the particular child, without any pre259. Id. (citations omitted).
260. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (referring to antigay discrimination flowing from
the Texas sodomy law in the fields of employment and family law); cf. id. at
2482 (opinion of the Court) (discussing generally the collateral consequences
flowing from the sodomy law).
261. D.W.W., 717 So. 2d at 797 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 797-98.
263. Id. at 798.
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sumption based on sexual orientation. One hopes that the Supreme Court will not have to take cases to enforce this obvious
corollary of Lawrence. Most states have abandoned strong presumptions against custody by LGBT parents, and even states
in the South (the most traditionalist region) have been moving
in that direction. 64 This issue is one best left to state courts for
the time being, with the assumption that they will internalize
the lessons of Lawrence. If they do not, then the Supreme Court
should intervene to protect the interests of children and their
gay parents.
A harder issue is whether a trial judge can consider potential harms to the child based upon community negativity toward his lesbian or gay parent. This is not a permissible consideration when the negativity is racist in nature,26 ' and in my
view should ultimately not be a permissible consideration when
homophobia is the source of the negativity. The jurisprudence
of tolerance, however, would counsel against the Supreme
Court reaching out aggressively on this issue. This is precisely
the sort of issue that should be left to state courts to flesh out
and debate for the time being, and state judges all over the
country are increasingly willing and capable of handling these
custody disputes in a neutral way.266
3. Employment Discriminations.Also questionable in the
wake of Lawrence would be state and local government policies
or practices discriminating against employing LGBT people as
264. For examples where southern appeals courts have overturned trial
judge denials of custody or even restrictive visitations based, explicitly or inferentially, on a parent's bisexual or homosexual orientation, see Taylor v.
Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731, 739-40 (Ark. 2003), Packard v. Packard, 697 So. 2d
1292, 1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6, 8-9 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996); Fulk v. Fulk, 827 So. 2d 736, 742 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); McDonald
v. McDonald, 850 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). See also In re Parsons, 914 S.W.2d 889, 894-95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding trial court's
decision to grant custody to a mother living with her partner).
265. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (overturning a Florida
court's custody decision to remove a child from a racially mixed household).
266. In Jacoby v. Jacoby, 763 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), for example, a Florida appeals court overturned a trial court order denying custody
to a lesbian mother. The appellate court ruled that in order for a parent's sexual orientation to influence the custody decision, it must be shown that her
conduct had "a direct effect or impact upon the children." Id. at 413. Citing
and quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the appeals court held
that the trial court's reliance upon social stigma or societal prejudice in determining the best interests of the child was unfounded and inappropriate, because "the law cannot give effect to private biases." Id. (citing Palmore, 466
U.S. at 433).
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civil servants, police officers, and teachers. Some of these cases
would be closer calls than the earlier examples. Consider Shahar v. Bowers.267
The Georgia Attorney General's office offered a job to Robin
Brown, a top graduate of the Emory Law School. 268 Although
she had indicated on her application form that she was planning to marry another woman, this detail did not come to the
attention of Attorney General Michael Bowers (yes, the same
guy) until after the offer of employment was made.269 After her
wedding, and her change of name to Robin Shahar, Bowers
withdrew the offer, based only upon the "purported marriage
between you and another woman. As the chief legal officer of
this state inaction on my part would constitute tacit approval of
this purported marriage and jeopardize the proper functioning
of this office."27 ° Shahar filed a constitutional lawsuit. Bowers
defended his action on two grounds: the Supreme Court's
precedents gave him a wide discretion to choose personnel who
fit well with the needs of his office, and Hardwick provided a
more than sufficient reason why a law
2 71 enforcement office could
not hire an openly lesbian attorney.
Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the discrimination. Dissenting judges argued that the discrimination was
based solely on Shahar's sexual orientation (or, in the alternative, her protected First Amendment expression of her commitment to another woman) and therefore reflected the same
kind of antigay "animus" that had been fatal in Romer.272 Invoking Hardwick as important background context, the majority
responded that it was reasonable for the Attorney General to
interpret Shahar's same-sex marriage:
[Als having a realistic likelihood to affect her (and, therefore, the Department's) credibility, to interfere with the Department's ability to
handle certain kinds of controversial matters (such as claims to same
sex marriage licenses, homosexual parental rights, employee benefits,
insurance coverage of "domestic partners"), to interfere with the Department's efforts to enforce Georgia's laws against homosexual sodomy, and to create other difficulties within the Department which

267.
(1998).
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
ing).

114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1100.
at 1100-01.
at 1101.
at 1125 (Kravitch, J., dissenting); id. at 1126-27 (Birch, J., dissent-
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Unlike Limon and D.W. W., the role of Bowers v. Hardwick
in supporting this discrimination is less direct. Neither the Attorney General nor the court said that Shahar was disqualified
because she was a presumptive criminal. Instead, both said
that she was disqualified because the public would lose confidence in the state's chief law enforcement office if it were
widely known that an open lesbian was an employee there. 74
Shaharis a harder case than the earlier ones because the state
is not invading Shahar's liberty as deeply and because of the
public context, where federal courts defer to judgments of state
officials. So there are good arguments for allowing the discrimination, even after Lawrence.
On the other hand, now that Georgia can no longer consider Robin Shahar a presumptive criminal, is it legitimate for
the state to penalize her because some of its citizens continue to
do so? Could the Attorney General have denied Shahar a job
based upon his perception that the people of Georgia would lose
confidence in an office staffed with Jews? Surely not. One
might say, with Justice White, that antigay sentiment is more
pervasive in Georgia than anti-Semitism, but I am dubious.
Georgia was the situs for the most violent anti-Semitic incident
in the United States of the twentieth century, the lynching of
Leo Frank by a bigoted mob,275 and my relatives in Atlanta report that anti-Semitic sentiments are still openly expressed in
country clubs and boardrooms of that state. Also, the antihomosexual views Justice White attributed to Georgians were
surely overstated. When the Georgia Supreme Court struck
down its consensual sodomy law as a violation of the state constitution in 1998, there was scarcely a ripple of protests from
traditionalists .7 6
Shahar remains a close case. I find more merit in the dissenters' approach, and Lawrence certainly provides them with
additional support. In 1998, the Supreme Court denied Shahar's petition for certiorari, which I think was the best approach. For now, the issue of job discrimination, especially in
law enforcement and education, is best handled by state courts
and federal circuit courts applying Romer and Lawrence. In my
273. Id. at 1105 (majority opinion).
274. Id. at 1101.
275. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (1968); ROBERT
SEITZ FREY & NANCY THOMPSON-FREY, THE SILENT AND THE DAMNED (1988).

276. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
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view, there is an emerging consensus that sexual orientation
ought not be a relevant job criterion for either state or private
employment. Once (or if) that consensus becomes clearer, the
Supreme Court would then be well advised to settle the matter
in favor of the antidiscrimination norm.
ConstitutionalVulnerability of Specific Antigay Policies, USA, 2004
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The table on this page sums up the implications of Lawrence and its jurisprudence of tolerance for the most important
remaining discriminations against LGBT people. The table's
conclusions are provisional because several of the variables are
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dynamic-they will change over time. Most obviously dynamic
is the horizontal coherence feature of the rule of law: A policy
coherent with other policies in the same and other jurisdictions
today may not be coherent twenty years from now. For example, Hardwick was decided in a more defensible context for allowing consensual sodomy laws than Lawrence because half the
states and the District of Columbia still had such laws in 1986,
while at most fourteen states did in 2003.
The libertarian assumption contains a less obvious dynamic component: Whether there are third-party harms often
depends critically on changing social understandings of the
world. A generation ago, most Americans believed that "homosexuals" were more likely to molest children than heterosexuals. 77 In that social context, judges would inevitably be skeptical of leaving custody of children with lesbian or gay parents,
because custody might be harmful to children. Traditionalists
still trot out this justification for opposing such custody, 278 but
social scientists have shown it to be a complete canard.279
The most dynamic element of the table is, of course, the
judgment about whether Supreme Court intervention setting a
constitutional floor will lower or raise the stakes of politics in
the LGBT/TFV culture clash. In America today, an authoritative judicial decision either requiring or rebuffing same-sex
marriage would raise the stakes of such politics, and that alone
is reason for the Court to avoid decision. Twenty years from
now, if public opinion has become more accepting of gay people
277. See, e.g., ALBERT D. KLASSEN ET AL., SEX AND MORALITY IN THE U.S.:
AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE KINSEY INSTITUTE 178
tbl.7-7 (Hubert J. O'Gorman ed., 1989) (synthesizing a 1970 public opinion poll
finding that over 70% of respondents strongly or somewhat agree with the
statements that "[h]omosexuals try to play sexually with children if they cannot get a partner" and that "[homosexuals are dangerous as teachers or youth
leaders, because they try to get sexually involved with children").
278. See Lynn D. Wardle, The PotentialImpact of Homosexual Parenting
on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 865-66 & 866 n.180. But see Carlos A.
Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle:Morality, Social Science, and
Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (collecting social science
data that refute Professor Wardle's assertion that LGBT parents are more
prone to molest their children than straight parents).
279. Straight males are the group most likely to molest children; the
groups least likely to abuse them are lesbians and straight women; gay men
fall somewhere in between, but openly gay men are also lowest risk in this regard. Cf Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 41 (1994) (describing results from a study of the
medical records of abused children indicating that the children were unlikely
to have been abused by homosexuals).
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and the consensus norm is that homosexuality and heterosexuality are both benign traits, then same-sex marriage will be a
constitutional given. So long as the country is not only intensely divided on the issue, but also divided along identityconstituting lines, this is not an issue the judiciary can resolve.
That same-sex marriage is irresolvable by the U.S. Supreme Court does not mean that state supreme courts cannot
address it. The key variable is how much (if any) normative
progress the LGBT rights movement has made in that jurisdiction. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,2 0 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court suggested that its
citizens had reached that point. By postponing the effect of its
judgment for six months, the Court invited those citizens to
think about same-sex marriage and engage their legislators in
that debate. As a law professor, I have no useful judgment as to
whether the court's perception was accurate, but its approach
was procedurally correct. My one prediction is that when samesex marriage comes to Massachusetts, it will not be the
Armageddon that opponents fear, nor will it be the great social
upheaval that many proponents espouse. The reason is that by
that time it will be clear that local norms have accommodated
the complete equal citizenship of LGBT people.

280. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (invalidating the same-sex marriage bar
under the Massachusetts Constitution but postponing the effect of the judgment for 180 days so that the legislature can take appropriate action).

